China Greenspace 中国绿区

China's emissions to peak in 2030! (?)

2009-08-17T19:45:00.000-07:00

CGS woke up today to a Reuters report that some of China's leading climate experts urge the adoption of policies to make the county's carbon dioxide emissions growth to slow by 2020, and to peak by 2030. The suggestion, made in a report signed by many heavy-weight researchers and policy analysts, urges the government to consider a variety of policies, including a carbon tax and even a domestic cap and trade system, to effectively cap emissions by 2030. Perhaps most notably, the report stresses the need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions within the next few decades in order to avoid catastrophic ecological damage.

The study's authors were careful to note that their analysis is merely a recommendation, and has not been endorsed by policymakers. Yet China's government has signaled in recent weeks that their hard-line position on climate may be softening (see Green Leap Forward). Even if the study really is just a "research exercise," as its authors claim, it's one that marks a sea change in public thinking among the country's elite. Moreover, it's promising that the report stresses the ecological imperatives behind climate change- and the threat to China's development objectives- rather than the tired rhetoric of who's to blame for global aggregate emissions.

But what might it mean in practice? Even if China were to come out with a commitment to peak emissions by 2030, it doesn't mean we're out of the climate woods yet. China's much-touted energy efficiency targets and renewable energy scale-ups have been characterized by statistical fudging and fuzzy math (see, once again, Green Leap Forward). The country desperately needs a robust system for measuring and verifying emissions reductions. In particular, China lacks experience with regulatory frameworks for emissions reduction, as well as both the software and know-how to model emissions reductions- both clear imperatives for international cooperation.

And, of course, the study could simply be a trial balloon that gets shot down by China's higher-ups. But when you're dealing with things as foreboding as climate change, you've got to take comfort where you can, and China's "2050 China Energy and CO2 Emissions Report" at least represents an enlightened and sober view of what China must do to prevent catastrophic atmospheric disruption.

Progress towards Cophenhagen

2009-08-05T00:52:00.000-07:00

Two quick but important notes on progress towards the negotiations at Copenhagen. First, there's been increased talk of the climate issue becoming the organizing principle of US-China relations (see US Department of State briefing on the recent SED). While this growing importance has yet to produce substantive results, it's an astounding shift from US-China relations during most of the Bush years (asterisk: former Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson gets credit for including some climate issues under the previous iteration of the SED), when energy and environment were scarcely mentioned. In any case, it's good news, since deployment of clean technology in China will be a decades-long task that will have to take place in the context of a robust US-China relationship.

Second, South Korea became the first developing country to commit to greenhouse gas emissions caps by 2020, with significant implications for the Copenhagen agreement. I'll leave most commentary to Green Leap Forward, but suffice it to say South Korea's actions provide the first clear blueprint for how a developing country can formulate a sustainable, low-carbon development path. If it works, it will save the world. One can only hope that New Delhi and Beijing- and Pretoria, Brasilia, and Hanoi- are watching.

Progress, but not enough

2009-07-26T00:27:00.000-07:00

CGS has been out of action for a while. A combination of travel and the continuing difficulties of lying behind the Great Firewall (Blogspot.com domains can only be accessed via proxy servers on the Chinese mainland) have contributed to this. However, CGS will maintain postings when possible.

In the past few weeks, of course, US Energy Secretary Steven Chu visited China, making a very favorable impression and launching important initiatives such as a Memorandum of Understanding on building energy efficiency and pledging $15 million for a joint US-China clean energy research center. Despite the progress, the prospects for significant Chinese concessions at Copenhagen look little better.

In fact, China has gone on something of a public relations blitz recently, highlighting its efforts to improve energy efficiency. The Shanghai Daily newspaper recently featured an article entitled "China fights climate change in its own way," which thoughtfully highlighted the Chinese Cabinet's decision to reduce energy use by encouraging its members to forgo wearing suits inside its meeting halls. China's Vice Premier, Li Keqiang, has also been making the rounds stumping China's energy efficiency and renewable energy policies. China Daily even featured an editorial that questioned the current focus on climate change in favor of population control- not an unreasonable argument, but the implication was that China is doing its part for the world's environment simply by limiting its population increase.

Of course, China has made impressive commitments to limiting the increase in its greenhouse gas emissions. Officials have said recently, for example, that China is on track to produce 20% of its energy from renewable sources by 2020. But all of this is only a start. Despite the impressive numbers, there's a great deal of doubt if such policies will meaningfully reduce China's emissions. See, for example, this report indicating that China's much-touted wind farms have significantly lower capacity than intended, reducing the amount of electricity they can actually produce.

CGS has often observed the sea change in China's efforts to control its emissions over the past three or so years. There's been tremendous progress, for which China can rightly claim recognitions. But, as in the United States, where the landmark ACES legislation may be further eroded by special interests, it's doubtful whether China's actions will be enough to prevent dangerous climate change impacts. Let's hope there's something big coming in Copenhagen.

Report from "China and Global Climate Change" Conference at Lingnan University, Hong Kong

2009-06-19T00:16:00.001-07:00

CGS has been in Hong Kong this week as a participant in the "China and Global Climate Change" conference at Lingnan University. The conference has been remarkable in the range of perspectives represented, including everything from psychology to meteorology to social theorists. As one of the few academic gatherings with a specific focus on China and climate change, CGS strongly recommends checking out the conference website for access to the proceedings.

A few things of particular note:

First, many of those focusing on China's participation in global climate negotiations were pessimistic, primarily because there is a great deal of scepticism that the goals of fairness (i.e., accounting for the West's historic emissions) can be reconciled with the ecological imperative of preventing severe climate change. One political theorist (papers are currently not for attribution- sorry!) suggested that this situation should compel Western countries to take a hard line with China and other developing nations, essentially jettisoning the fairness consideration in favor of taking punitive measures, such as carbon tariffs, on imports from countries which refuse to participate in global efforts to reduce emissions.

Second, assessments of localized climate impacts appear to grow only more complex. One, particularly thorough study of climate change impacts on food security suggested that when all factors are considered, including socio-economic and water availability changes, food production is likely to remain largely unchanged under most IPCC climate scenarios. However, local impacts will be likely to vary tremendously, and expensive adaptation will likely be required to mitigate negative climate impacts on agriculture.

Third, more attention needs to be paid to changing consumption patterns in China, especially in the longer run. This will include buying fewer new-use products, low-emission buildings, hybrid-electric vehicles and bikes, and generally building more sustainable cities (in this vein, it's welcome news that China will build 19 urban railways by 2015). Such an emphasis on low-carbon lifestyles will be a big shift from the government's current, production-side focus on reducing energy and resource consumption (the Circular Economy concept). NGOs may therefore have to play a crucial role.

To CGS, the conference reinforced the point that climate negotiations with China will come down to two things: how clean technology is transferred to China, and how adaptation efforts are financed. The first part will likely require innovative licensing arrangements for technology developed in the US but produced in China, and Congress won't like that very much. The second goal will likely need to be focused on agriculture and rural development.

Report from Stern's visit to Beijing

2009-06-09T07:42:00.000-07:00

Todd Stern and a US climate cooperation delegation made an appearance at a roundtable discussion at Tsinghua University today, which CGS weaseled itself into. It was "off the record," so to to maintain whatever journalistic integrity it has, CGS will only refer to general comments and threads of discussion (Chatham House rules).

With one exception, a really good, but unattributable quote: "We are mindful of the unforgiving imperative of the atmosphere." Well, CGS for one will sleep a little better knowing that.

Unfortunately, the rules of the game haven't changed: China still emphasizes the need for growth and development, while the US side slowly chips away at China's protests that it is a developing country, noting that China cannot claim to be as helpless in the face of climate change as, say, Haiti.

However, the roundtable did come closer to identifying a key negotiating front than previous sessions: technology cooperation. The Chinese side, possibly because it was dominated by representatives of the energy and engineering bureaucracy, constantly called for technology transfer. The US side forthrightly said that the United States has neither the monetary resources nor the political will to finance China's clean energy transformation: it can purchase the technology on the open market. What's needed, they said, is closer to an equitable (presumably meaning the US won't pay) "technology cooperation" arrangement.

A possible foundation for compromise emerged when Chinese representatives responded by saying that the US can do more to promote development of technologies that meet China's needs as a developing country, something most feasibly done through private-sector partnerships. Governments, meanwhile, can collaborate on enhancing China's capacity for clean technology deployment and implementation, especially in the area of measuring, verifying, and reporting emissions.

That might be something Congress can live with. But one big hurdle remains, and one recognized by both sides: intellectual property (IP). Both sides noted that there's a lot of misunderstanding on this issue, that China is actually better on some IP issues than it's given credit for, and that there's a whole range of technologies, mostly in energy efficiency, where IP issues are not a significant impediment.

So long and short, a focus of continued negotiations should be on capacity building in technology transfer, not simply discussion of the transfer and financing itself. To offer some CGS commentary, the Chinese side didn't seem to be budging much, but that's understandable: at a minimum, the US has to pass domestic cap and trade legislation before China can be expected to make any concessions. But you do have to take a step back and think: a bunch of earnest, capable people all speaking frankly about the importance of US-China climate cooperation for the future of the world. That would have been almost unimaginable a year ago.

Mr. Stern goes to Beijing

2009-06-07T18:20:00.000-07:00

Todd Stern, the chief American climate negotiator, arrived yesterday in Beijing for talks meant to pave the way for Copenhagen. The New York Times quoted Congressman Edward Markey, co-sponsor of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, who recently returned from a Beijing trip, as saying, "This is going to be one of the most complex diplomatic negotiations in the history of the world."

It's not too much hyperbole to go even further and say it will also be one of the most important, determining a great deal of the ecological fate of the world this century. Given this importance, what China says and does between Stern's visit and the negotiations at Copenhagen will also signal a great deal about what kind of country China really is, and what kind of power it aspires to become. If it offers sensible concessions and true partnership to the United States, we can be reassured that China wants to buy into a rules-based global order, in which there is a strong presumption of common interest. It would also speak well of China's technocratic regime (though it will be, and should be, forever in the shadow of Mao's totalitarianism and Tiannanmen). If, on the other hand, China sticks to its current talking points, which offer no concrete emissions reduction and continue to blame the West for climate change, we can all grow a lot more concerned about the future of international cooperation.

(See also Julian Wong's excellent summary of what China has done to date on climate change).

Climate change as a security issue for China

2009-06-06T02:04:00.000-07:00

CGS has been absent for the last month, having been caught on the wrong side of China's Great Firewall (The twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre was Thursday). CGS has also been working on a paper entitled "Climate Change, Water, and China's National Security," to be presented at a conference in Hong Kong later this month.

Here's what CGS learned and concluded:

China and its neighboring countries are in for several acute water-related impacts as a result of climate change. Some areas of northwest China and eastern India will face severe irrigation challenges as water availability from Himalayan glacial meltwater decreases precipitously by the end of the century. Second, arid regions of China, especially the north, will become even drier. Third, south China and the Mekong delta will come under severe risk of catastrophic flooding. Essentially, most parts of China will have too little water when they need it (the dry season), and too much when they don't (the wet season).

China is fortunate in that it is wealthy enough that it can adapt to many of the worst consequences of these climactic changes. It can build dams and flood control infrastructure to store water and prevent destructive flooding, and it can invest in massive schemes like the South-North Water Transfer project to redress regional water shortages. Even if water shortages threaten crop production in China's breadbasket northern regions, China is wealthy enough that it can import much greater amounts of food.

What is clear is that water-related climate impacts will stress social and political institutions. Yes, China can invest in adaptation, but it will be expensive. Government agencies and the military will be harder pressed to develop response capabilities to water shortages. Meanwhile, water shortages threaten social stability in fragile areas of China, especially Xinjiang. Finally, water issues will become a more prominent feature of China's foreign relations, for which it is currently unprepared and inexperienced.

Climate change does not (obviously) threaten China's security in the same way that Soviet Russia once did, or that (according to the censors...) Twitter does today (it has been blocked for weeks). Rather, it will be an acute stress factor for social and political actors. Add in the many other such stressors (income inequality, economic hardship, political illiberalism, etc), and China will be compelled to pay more attention to climate impacts in the coming years.

Of course, and this is important on the eve of the US climate envoy's visit to China, China wouldn't have to worry so much if it commits to reduce its GHG emissions at Copenhagen this December. CGS believes the enduring value of seeing climate as a strategic issue for China is that it can help compel Beijing to see that climate change will stress China's social and political foundations, and is not simply an economic or ecological issue. Many of the government's great projects, such as the Western Development Project (Xibu da kaifa) will be greatly imperiled by climate impacts.

On an only partially related note:

A brief word on the climate negotiations: I've recently been in several fora where I've gotten into arguments about the necessity of China accepting firm commitments, and it's just this simple: China is too big for it to be an X factor in the global climate equation. Any formula the negotiators come up with in Copenhagen is meaningless unless China's contribution is codified.

CGS knows it's preaching to the choir here, but had to get that off its chest.

Getting Serious on Climate: the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009

2009-05-09T01:12:00.000-07:00

Early last month, the US House of Representatives released a public summary of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (CGS is a little behind on this, but better late than never!). The Act, abbreviated ACESA, is important to US-China climate cooperation for several reasons. The first of these is obvious: with wide-ranging provisions to ramp up energy efficiency and introduce a domestic cap-and-trade system for carbon dioxide, it's America's first serious attempt to reduce its national greenhouse gas emissions to responsible levels. Second, the Act includes several far-sighted provisions for international cooperation, several of which bear specifically on China.

First, a survey of the Act's most revolutionary and hard-hitting provisions. For starters, the Act requires that retail electricity providers obtain 25% of their energy from renewable sources, a far higher share than at present. It also envisions the creation of a "smart grid" to efficiently distribute electricity, which would represent the largest investment in America's energy infrastructure since rural electrification programs in the 1930s. A provision to enable federal agencies to negotiate purchases of renewable energy could potentially have far-reaching impacts; if, for example, the Department of Interior were to do so, it could stimulate rural renewable sources, since many Interior facilities are located in America's heartland.

By far the most eye-catching part of ACESA, however, is its cap and trade system:

The draft establishes a market-based program for reducing global warming pollution from electric utilities, oil companies, large industrial sources, and other covered entities that collectively are responsible for 85% of U.S. global warming emissions. Under this program, covered entities must have tradable federal permits, called “allowances,” for each ton of pollution emitted into the atmosphere. Entities that emit less than 25,000 tons per year of CO2 equivalent are not covered by this program. The program reduces the number of available allowances issued each year to ensure that aggregate emissions from the covered entities are reduced by 3% below 2005 levels in 2012, 20% below 2005 levels in 2020, 42% below 2005 levels in 2030, and 83% below 2005 levels in 2050.

The biggest implication of this provision is that, if adopted, there will be no major industrialized country without serious legislation in place to dramatically reduce carbon dioxide emissions. This will inevitably shift the focus towards the world's emerging emissions superpowers, India and China.

Some smaller provisions, if taken to scale, may also have implications for China: ACESA suggests that substantial resources will be devoted to investing in carbon capture and storage (CCS), improving building and appliance energy efficiency, and greening the transport sector. All of these are areas in which American technical knowledge can be profitably employed in China. One provision though is certain to anger China: a stipulation that

To ensure that U.S. manufacturers are not put at a disadvantage relative to overseas competitors, the draft authorizes companies in certain industrial sectors to receive “rebates” to compensate for additional costs incurred under the program. Sectors that use large amounts of energy, and produce commodities that are traded globally, would be eligible for the rebates. If the President finds that the rebate provisions do not sufficiently correct competitive imbalances, the President is directed to establish a “border adjustment” program. Under that program, foreign manufacturers and importers would be required to pay for and hold special allowances to “cover” the carbon contained in U.S.-bound products.

Apart from these articles, though, are specific provisions that address international cooperation. At the international level, experts (and the Bali Roadmap) have long stressed addressing both mitigation and adaptation. ACESA has learned this lesson, and includes a section directing the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration to create a National Climate Service, and each federal agency to conduct a review of climate adaptation issues. Even more importantly, however, it also "creates an International Climate Change Adaptation Program within USAID to provide U.S. assistance to the most vulnerable developing countries for adaptation to climate change."

Finally, and most significantly for China, ACESA also includes a provision

to provide U.S. assistance to encourage widespread deployment of clean technologies to developing countries. The draft specifies that only developing countries that have ratified an international treaty and undertaken nationally appropriate mitigation activities that achieve substantial greenhouse gas reductions are eligible for funding.

This language, with its stipulation that recipients of clean technology assistance ratify an emissions-mitigation treaty, seems aimed directly at India and China.

In sum, then, ACESA represents a great leap forward for the US on climate change issues. First, if adopted and implemented fully, it promises to shift the political burden for reducing emissions more resolutely on the developing world, within which China is the biggest target. The adaptation fund provision, if (and it's a big if) fully funded, could help the US to diplomatically isolate China and other big-country emitters from their allies in the more impoverished developing world, thereby increasing leverage for China and India to agree to concrete measures to reduce their emissions. Second, it includes several provisions that lay the groundwork for effective US-China cooperation on the development and deployment of clean technologies at a large scale.

Sadly, there are also significant pitfalls for ACESA acting as a catalyst for greater US-China climate cooperation. First, the "climate protectionist" provision of the bill will almost certainly raise China's ire, and will probably provoke retaliatory measures if it is passed by Congress. In the long run, such protectionism will damage technology cooperation efforts, to the benefit of no one. Second, and most damagingly, it looks like ACESA will require significant watering-down to secure passage through Congress. As The New York Times has reported, the bill faces significant opposition from conservative Democrats and Republicans, especially in these jobs-hemorrhaging times.

Nonetheless, ACESA demonstrates that the pendulum is swinging towards action on climate in America, and that means it will be a bigger issue for China, too. The future for US-China climate cooperation remains brighter than it has ever been. What remains unclear is if it will actually outshine the many dark clouds that the threat of climate change continue to cast over China, America, and the world at large.

Planning for Smart Growth

2009-05-08T03:47:00.000-07:00

CGS is returning from a long absence, much of which was spent researching developments in the United Arab Emirates, which due to its oil reserves and carbon-intensive model of development is of great importance to the global environment. The thing that most blew CGS away, however, is Abu Dhabi's Sufrace Transport Masterplan. The plan envisions moving up to 50,000 people every two minutes, using a visionary combination of heavy and light rail, bus, traffic demand management, and transit-oriented development. The scale of the plan is astounding, not least because it entails creating one of the world's most extensive transport networks essentially from scratch by 2030.

China would do well to study it. The country may not have the Emirate's per-capita wealth (this courtesy of the country's oil reserves), but China does face a similar trend of urban population growth. Sustainable transport strategies, along with smart urban planning, will be crucial to easing (and greening) China's rapid transition to becoming an urban nation.

A recent article by Energy Foundation analyst Felix Creutzig in China Dialogue provides some indication of the imperative for smart growth. According to his analysis, the cost of congestion in the capital (Beijing has some 3.6 million cars) and air polluion amont to 7.5% of Beijing's GDP, excluding the high cost of vehicle emission contributions to climate change.

Creutzig offers a number of recommendations, including the building of satellite towns with transit-oriented development and the implementation of congestion pricing. Indeed, Beijing already has a few good examples of smart planning: the Xizhimen transport hub, for example, pretty successfully integrates long-distance rail, urban rail, and bus links with a large commercial complex and nearby residential areas.

Smart growth will not, of course, solve China's (or the world's) climate problems, but it makes sense for many other reasons, not the least of which is economic, as Creutzig shows. Moreover, smart growth maximizes co-benefits from reducing air pollution and congestion.

The principal impediment to promoting smart growth in China is the chaotic nature of local government. Beijing is in a better position than most, since it is a "municipality" that integrates local and provincial government. But for smart growth to take hold, the creation of multi-jurisditcional, regional planning organizations could be a big help.

Co-authored editorial with Julian Wong of Green Leap Forward

2009-04-18T09:16:00.000-07:00

Readers of this blog will be familiar with the argument that a bolder, more aggressive stance on climate change will benefit China in a great many ways. The following is a hopefully more persuasive version of that argument, co-authored with Julian Wong of The Green Leap Forward, and published in last week's China Daily:

The year 2009 may well be remembered as the Year of Climate Cooperation. Shortly after the New Year, the inauguration of Barack Obama heralded a new effort to reduce America's greenhouse gas emissions, and to place special emphasis on working with China on climate issues. In a few more months, the world's nations will gather in Copenhagen, Denmark, to try to forge a global agreement to prevent catastrophic climate change.

The tide of history is shifting towards a belated but crucial effort to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. China has a uniquely important opportunity to help shape this momentous new chapter in history, one that can be grasped by taking a new look at its national policy on climate change.

The Chinese government's 2008 "White Paper on China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change," together with the 2007 National Climate Change Program, outlines substantial efforts to improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions. China has an opportunity to build on this effort by formulating a visionary policy that will enhance its national security, promote sustainable economic development and position it as a full partner in one of the most important global efforts of our era.

A visionary national climate change policy should be forward-thinking - too much time has been wasted in debates over the carbon that is "embedded" in China's exports and the responsibility of developed nations for the majority of historical global emissions.

These arguments are not wholly without merit but miss the point at a time when all nations, including China, must act quickly to build energy-efficient, low-carbon economies or risk runaway climate change.

A national climate change policy should also express China's willingness, in time, to commit to greenhouse gas emissions reductions, focusing initially on specific industrial sectors and, eventually, on economy-wide "caps" on total emissions. This step is necessary since battling climate change requires the decrease of absolute emissions of each nation, as opposed to merely decreasing energy consumption per unit of GDP, which is China's current policy.

The policy should use a mixture of incentives and mandates, to place China on the road to an energy transformation, away from conventional fossil-fuel power generation and towards the use of renewable energy sources and energy conservation measures.

China will benefit from a bold and visionary climate policy in several areas including enhanced security since the country will be in an increasingly precarious position as a result of changing climate, particularly in terms of water availability.

Most of the major river systems that feed and water China, India, and Southeast Asia depend on meltwater from the Himalayan region. Climate change is endangering this vital source of water for 60 percent of the human population. Himalayan glaciers, which provide some 70 percent of the flow of major Asian rivers, are melting at an extremely rapid rate; one study, published in the prestigious journal Nature, predicts that the Himalayan-Hindu Kush region will start to "run out of water" during the dry season. Besides disrupting agricultural activities and destabilizing massive and volatile populations, such a situation would imperil China's economic growth.

Additionally, the aggressive pursuit of a truly low carbon economy can help establish an era of unparalleled innovation and economic prosperity. A study by CERNA, for example, shows that countries that committed themselves to mandatory emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol experienced increased levels of innovation in green technologies over those that did not.

The depth and diversity of these economic development opportunities are enormous; China can create millions of urban, high-tech jobs in the manufacture, installation, operation and maintenance of renewable power systems. It can also revive rural economies through the development of sustainable agriculture practices. In all regions, huge amounts of money can be saved as citizens breathe cleaner air and drink cleaner water, reducing the incidence of some diseases.

Action on climate change is also an important sign of membership in the international community. Climate change has emerged as a global issue of paramount importance and by demonstrating that it is prepared to act boldly to combat climate change , China can help to reinforce its image as a responsible nation. Two Hunan University professors wrote in a recent China Daily editorial that "developing a low-carbon economic is a must as China continues to industrialize, not only for the nation's energy security but also as part of an urgent international responsibility to address global climate change."

By embracing this responsibility, China can gain recognition as a full partner in one of the most important global efforts in human history, while also ensuring it has a seat at the table as a global agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is forged.

The fundamental value in a bold, visionary national climate policy is that it builds the foundation for a sustainable future. China stands to gain a great deal from becoming a leader in green technologies, a resource-efficient economy, and a largely self-sufficient energy consumer. China's current policy on climate change is significant and a step in the right direction, but hopefully it represents merely a rough draft of a strategy equal to the challenge of climate change.

Scott Moore is a Fulbright Fellow with the Environmental Economics and Policy Study Group at Peking University. Julian Wong is an independent energy analyst, founder of the Beijing Energy Network, and author of the blog GreenLeapForward.com. The views expressed in the article are their own.

Bridging the developed/developing nation divide on climate

2009-04-03T20:41:00.001-07:00

One of the thorniest aspects of the global climate problem is how to apportion the burdens of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The old rich world is responsible for the vast majority of historic anthropogenic emissions, but the growth in global emissions comes largely from emerging markets, especially the Indo-Chinese giants.

As a result, scholars and climate experts devote a lot of time to thinking about how to break the deadlock (see previous post). Hu Angang, an economist at Tsinghua University, published an essay recently on China Dialogue that presents an interesting take on the issue, and proposes a new emissions reduction trajectory for China, which will be crucial to the success of the overall global effort to reduce emissions (see Climate Progress).

Essentially, Hu proposes defining four categories for emissions-reduction purposes based on the Human Development Index (HDI): high, medium-high, medium-low, and low. The last two categories would have no responsibility to reduce emissions, while the medium-high group, of which China is a member, would have emissions-reductions targets calculated according to the gap in their HDI value from the high category (0.8 or above on the HDI). These distinctions would also be used to calculate financing of adaptation and technology transfer.

According to Hu's formula, the following roadmap should be set for China:

By 2020 carbon dioxide emissions should have peaked;
By 2030 there should be annual emissions of less than 2.2 billion tonnes (a reduction to 1990 levels).
By 2050 there should be annual emissions of less than 1.1 billion tonnes (half of 1990 levels).

By way of comparison, the US emitted about 1.6 billion tonnes of carbon in 2007 (see article).

Promising as these targets are, what is more significant is Hu's phraseology in promoting them:

China’s international emissions reduction policy is not in step with the world. China is still considered a developing country, with no emissions reduction responsibilities, commitments or contributions toward meeting an international consensus.

A public commitment to reduce emissions, backed by central government targets, would be a massive spur to domestic emissions cuts. Participation in international climate-change negotiations and adopting climate-change regulations can provide the opportunity to implement of a beneficial energy and climate policy. More importantly, worsening climate change will increase the pressure to cut emissions. Failure to change energy and climate policy will mean choosing to fight over resources.

Yes, yes, yes! Hu's HDI approach is interesting, since it in theory ties mitigation burden to a broader range of factors than simply wealth; HDI is intended to measure institutional capacity and quality of life as well. But what's far more important is the premise of Hu's argument: that China's current climate change policy is out of step with the times, with its own national interest, and with reality.

In several recent, previous posts, CGS has described a shift in tone on climate issues. Hu's essay is another indication that elite opinion in China may be shifting towards one that accepts more concrete responsibility to reduce emissions. Let's certainly hope that shift is in evidence at the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen this December.

China and America's new climate legislation

2009-03-31T23:10:00.000-07:00

The New York Times reported today that two members of the US House of Representatives have released a draft version of a bill intended to cut US greenhouse gas emissions by 83% from 1990 levels by 2050. The bill is only a first step; Climate Progress has a good piece on why any such climate legislation will face greater hurdles in the Senate.

Nonetheless, the bill represents another milestone in the long trek towards solving the climate problem. Charles McElwee at China Environmental Law Blog has a good post on the implications of the bill for US-China climate cooperation, technology transfer, and joint emissions reductions. The most significant impact of the legislation, though, is likely to be simply that the United States takes climate change seriously (finally!). It will soon become developing nations' turn to do so.

Against crisis, China attempts to tighten enforcement of pollution laws

2009-03-29T21:10:00.000-07:00

Following last month's acid spill in Jiangsu, China's government has acted to tighten enforcement of the country's environmental laws. Charles McElwee's China Environmental Law Blog reports that the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) has issued a new Notice containing several innovative policies, including a focus on corrective action, designed to strengthen enforcement of China's environmental laws (see also previous post on problems in the country's environmental enforcement).

This move comes as part of a broader effort by Beijing to improve environmental protection, especially as it concerns water pollution. In February, following the Jiangsu disaster, a senior MEP official acknowledged that despite several previous attempts to control pollution, "The general situation of environmental pollution does not allow us to be optimistic" (see Xinhua).

This month appears to have brought redoubled efforts to redress the situation. An MEP circular issued last week castigated local authorities for lax enforcement of water pollution laws, and to improve water quality monitoring (see Xinhua). Officials also announced today (March 30) that thirteen officials in Henan province were punished (one with a prison sentence) for failing to stop arsenic contamination on a stretch of the Dasha river, which news reports said was some 899 times healthy levels (see Xinhua).

Such efforts to strengthen the enforcement of environmental laws are necessary, but they illustrate an important failing in China's environmental policy: its obsession with the idea of a centralized "policy cudgel." What I mean by this is the insistence that the central government's policies would indeed improve China's environmental situation, if only local governments could be cowed into following orders (this appears to be a primary motivation behind recent MEP Regional Supervision Centers- more on this later). This approach is far too blunt an instrument, particularly when China's legal system doesn't bear anything like the enforcement capabilities wielded by, say, the US Environmental Protection Administration.

Instead of focusing on building a bigger and more potent cudgel, Beijing should focus on the longer-term tasks of enhancing citizen participation and NGO monitoring capabilities to aid in environmental enforcement, while also pursuing political and legal reforms that will make it easier to take polluters, and the corrupt officials that protect them, to court. Promotion of officials based on economic growth statistics should be ended. Moreover, less coercive, market-based approaches like Payment for Ecosystem Services should be pursued aggressively.

Robust environmental protection requires an expensive, resource- and bureaucracy-intensive edifice. But the public interests it protects- clean air, clean water, healthy people- are vital to a prosperous, sustainable society.

Climate impacts in China

2009-03-25T18:42:00.000-07:00

We're all in for a rocky road ahead if climate change continues apace. But China, as a large, still mostly poor, ecologically diverse region, faces a special set of challenges, as the government acknowledges (see "China's Policies and Actions in Addressing Global Climate Change"). This post draws on some recent news reports to illustrate some of the various impacts China is likely to confront as the climate changes.

One is disease: as many high-altitude and high-latitude areas warm, the viable ranges of pathogens and disease vectors (like mosquitoes) increase. Zhao Linnuo, Deputy-Director of the China Applied Meteorology Office, explained to Xinhua that atmospheric warming produces conditions favorable to the spread and propagation of insect-borne diseases. "If pathogens formerly confined to the south were to spread to the north," Zhao said, "diseases [formerly confined to the] wild may spread into inhabited areas; at the same time, the incidence of food-borne diseases is likely to increase as a result of warming." Climate change would also impact human health, Zhao noted, via secondary impacts on precipitation, wind velocity, and pollution concentrations (see Xinhua, in Chinese only).

Another expert, Jin Yinlong, explained that climate change will increase the incidence of both flooding and drought; in the former case, it would also lead to the spread of water-borne disease. "Climate change is likely to impact all people in different ways," Jin said.

In a separate interview, the Vice-Director of China's Meteorological Bureau warned that "from now on, extreme weather events will grow more frequent." Because China's population density and GDP total will also increase, Xu Xiaofeng noted, its vulnerability to extreme weather events, including flooding, hurricanes, etc., will become more acute. The article also noted that from 2001-2008, the cost of natural disasters is estimated to have accounted for some 2.8% of China's GDP (see China Economic Weekly, in Chinese only).

Perhaps most importantly, the officials also offered prescriptions on how to counter the threats posed by the spread of disease and extreme weather. The former article noted that atmospheric experts "call on businesses and the people at large to take steps to increase their awareness of climate change, safeguard the air we breathe, make a habit of saving energy to reduce emissions, sparely use wooden chopsticks and plastic bags, and rarely drive cars." Vice-Director Xu also noted that America has a robust disaster-warning system in place, one that China would do well to adopt.

These two articles nicely illustrate two of the key strategies for dealing with climate change: mitigation (as by driving fewer cars) and adaptation (warning people of natural disasters, which are likely to become more frequent). It's heartening to see so much talk of climate in the Chinese press; a few years ago, there was almost none. The high profile of expert discussion on climate also bodes well; it's much the same kind of citizen-science that has been so crucial in pushing the climate agenda forward in America.

But of course all of this means little unless China's elite agrees to do more to reduce its emissions. A recent editorial in China Daily nicely sums up the situation:

With nobody but ourselves to blame for increasingly frequent extreme weather conditions, it is high time we did something to reduce the greenhouse emissions we discharge. The convening of the United Nations' conference on climate change at the end of last year was a sign that increasing numbers of countries and politicians have come to realize that climate change is something that nations must jointly deal with. We cannot afford to wait until it is too late - when the rising seas have submerged continents and the disappearance of glaciers has dried up our rivers. This annual day [World Meteorological Day] should be a reminder to all that we have an impact on world weather, and that global warming is a matter of life and death.

Word. It's long past time to bicker about things like the amount of carbon embedded in China's exports, or even the admittedly stronger argument about the West's high levels of historic emissions (see previous post). China must move beyond its fixation on its developing-country status, to the more pressing issue of how it will be affected- in terms of disease, weather, water, etc- if it does not act to reduce its own emissions, which account for so much of the global total. China Daily hits exactly the right note- we hope it's one China is willing to sing at Copenhagen come December.

Focus on water in China

2009-03-24T21:28:00.000-07:00

The World Water Forum, which convened last week in Turkey, may not be the sexiest of international environmental gatherings. But it is likely to become one of the most important, for the chief human impact of climate change is likely to be profound changes in the availability and distribution of fresh water. Mindful of such importance, this post focuses on China's water situation in an age of climate change.

The devastating drought which hit northern China in recent months, affecting some 10.3 million hectares, was a potent reminder of the nation's precarious water situation. One farmer was quoted as saying, "I haven't seen such a severe drought in my life" (see Xinhua). Overpopulation, exacerbated by decades of disastrous, yield-maximizing agricultural policies, has devastated large portions of northern China, leaving it vulnerable to desertification, which climate change in turn is accelerating. Poor soil management results in extensive erosion; one recent report claimed that China loses 1 million mu (about 0.6 acres) of arable land annually to soil erosion (see Renmin Ribao, in Chinese only). In the meantime, climate models, while subject to significant uncertainty, suggest that seasonal runoff from the Himalayan plateau is likely to decrease precipitously in the coming years, affecting nearly all of China's major river systems (see previous post).

The gravity of the situation has not gone unnoticed by China's government. Its response to the drought was swift, issuing a "red alert" in some areas of the country, and providing emergency assistance. Meanwhile, experts issued a string of announcements focusing better on water management and efficiency. The President of the China Agricultural University emphasized water-saving irrigation techniques: "To deal with climate abnormalities, a growing water shortage, and the threat to food security, we must speed the use of farming and irrigation methods that save water" (see Xinhua). In early March, the powerful National Development and Reform Commission vowed to lower industrial water consumption by 5.6% and to increase the utilization of industrial wastewater to some 66% in 2009.

At the World Water Forum itself, China's Minister of Water Resources, Chen Lei, vowed to increase China's efforts to develop water resources for sustainable development. Chen highlighted ten areas where the government would ramp up water infrastructure investment:

"the reinforcement of risky reservoirs, rural drinking water security, water saving facility upgrading in large-scale irrigation areas, comprehensive management of major rivers and lakes, rehabilitation and upgrading of large-scale irrigation pumping stations, key water projects and water sources, water infrastructure construction in farmland, water and soil conservation, rural hydropower development and electrification, as well as capacity building" (see Xinhua).

At the Forum, China also issued a joint statement with Japan and South Korea pledging cooperation, information sharing, and "trilateral cooperation" on water issues (see Xinhua). There are a great many areas of fruitful cooperation on water management issues, including eco-compensation and watershed management.

The attention being devoted to water issues is welcome, but it's likely to be insufficient, for three primary reasons. First, China's main approach to water resource management so far has been to conduct giant engineering projects, like the South-North Water Transfer effort to bring water from the south to the arid north. But engineering alone is little more than a stop-gap measure, which a recent reservoir project in Shanghai illustrates. The Shanghai region, being a low-lying coastal estuary, is vulnerable to salt tides, which contaminate freshwater supplies. As the sea level rises, salt tides are a growing concern in coastal areas around the world. The government's response to salt tides has been to construct the giant Qingcaosha reservoir, with a capacity of 7.2 million cubic meters. But as the Shanghai Daily article announcing the reservoir notes, "A new reservoir is by no means the long-term answer to the city's chronic lack of clean water." Silt from the Yangtze (another result of soil erosion), the article notes, is likely to clog the reservoir. Moreover, if runoff to the Yangtze declines as propitiously as predicted, Shanghai may have to resort to expensive desalinization to supply adequate freshwater. Despite the temptation to think so, humanity can't simply engineer itself out of water shortages.

Which leads to the second challenge confronting water management in China: the shamefully low price of water. Despite continual pledges to raise it (see China.org.cn), the Chinese government has found it difficult to make poor peasant farmers, who account for the majority of wasteful water use in China, pay significantly more for water. As a result, the price remains too low to encourage the most advanced water saving techniques. According to one water expert, "Although water-saving measures are used in northern China, many mature technologies aren't popular because of the high cost and low awareness of saving water" (see Xinhua). So the impasse continues: as long as the government remains undecided about how to encourage rural economic development without raising the price of water, China's agricultural sector will continue to waste large amounts of water.

This is a dangerous path to tread, since there is likely to be less and less of it, at least in northern China. Climate change means that droughts and flooding are both likely to become more severe, and while the distribution of precipitation will undoubtedly change in many regions, it's likely to be for the worse. Engineering projects, like reservoirs and desalinization plants, will help with adaptation and the stabilization of drinking water supplies, but ultimately such engineering will not compensate for the shifts in water availability. That requires tackling climate change. So far, as CGS has continually documented, China has taken a very conservative position on climate issues (see previous post).

However, as a recent China Daily editorial illustrates, China is re-evaluating its stance as the crucial Copenhagen climate conference approaches in December. Climate change, the editorial notes, "is hitting the Asian continent already." Repeating a standard Chinese government line, the editorial emphasizes that Asian nations should push for more money for adaptation, but then goes on to note that "The focus on adaptation...should not distract us from also paying attention to the other major building block, mitigation, and formulating a clear strategy on the issue." While the focus should remain on pushing developed nations to reduce emissions, the editorial also says that calls for "urging larger developing countries to take whatever actions they can to reduce theirs without hampering their development aspirations." Most importantly, the editorial hits the right note in concluding that the Copenhagen agreement "will determine the fate of the world, in particular Asia, for decades to come."

Water is a key environmental issue for China, Asia, and the world, making its management one of the foremost considerations for policymakers everywhere. This requires negotiating thorny issues of access, fighting important agricultural constituencies, and many other issues. But it also entails solving the climate problem- the over-arching, all-important wildcard on the fate of which all other environmental issues will ultimately rest.

How to make international environmental cooperation work; Or, Report from EU Workshop on Carbon Capture and Sequestration Regulation

2009-03-22T19:07:00.000-07:00

This past Wednesday and Thursday, CGS attended a workshop on the European Union's Support to Regulatory Activities in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) (STRACO2) and Cooperation Action Within CCS EU-China (COACH) projects. The former, STRACO2, is devoted to gathering lessons for China from CCS regulatory regimes in place elsewhere, while the latter, according to its website, has as its main objective

"to prepare the ground for developing large-scale facilities for zero emission electric power using coal as a feedstock. Options for hydrogen production as well as for production of synthetic fuels, and provisions for heat integration with surrounding industries will be investigated too. In this endeavour CO2 capture and permanent storage - including use for enhanced oil or gas recovery (EOR or EGR) - constitute an inherent and decisive prerequisite."

Because they focus on a key climate change mitigation technology- CCS- the STRACO2/COACH projects represent an important case study in international environmental cooperation, hence CGS's interest. Briefly, CCS is a technology that envisions capturing carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion and "storing" it in impermeable geological formations, preventing its escape to the atmosphere. CCS is typically envisioned as a major "wedge" in reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, since it theoretically permits the use of abundant fossil fuels without contributing to the change in the planet's carbon balance. As one workshop speaker noted, many GHG reduction scenarios envision almost 30% of reductions coming from the large-scale deployment of CCS (see Rob Socolow and Steve Pacala's classic wedge paper on this). Problem is, it's far from a commercially-viable technology, hence the importance of the workshop. Deployment of CCS entails overcoming a number of challenges, including finding suitable geologic formations and developing an adequate regulatory framework for storing the carbon.

The STRACO2/COACH project is wide-ranging, including carbon storage site qualification and certification and financing. A particularly interesting feature of the STRACO2 project was the use of questionnaires to survey the CCS field in China, and which provide interesting insights into the prospects for China. Some 60 forms with questions on policy and finance, technology outlook, etc., were sent to a variety of environmental, energy, research, and consultancy firms in China, with 35 responses. These indicated that 43% of respondents see CCS as an "extremely important" technology for combatting climate change, while an additional 57% ranked it as "important." Respondents listed (in ranked order) high cost, unproven technology, underdeveloped law and policy, and underdeveloped technology as the most important barriers to CCS commercialization in China. Large majorities of respondents also reported that developed nations for pay for the development of CCS projects before commercialization, and that emissions trading offers the best prospect for long-term CCS financing. Notably, a significant majority also indicated that EOR technology, which involves injecting CO2 into oil wells as oil is withdrawn, represents the best storage option. Finally, respondents listed safety and responsibility as the most important considerations for developing a CCS regulatory regime in China.

The workshop also revealed a number of more general considerations and points of interest. There is a significant degree of suspicion over whether carbon can be safely stored underground, and whether "leakage" of carbon dioxide may pose a health risk to surrounding communities. China's geological storage potential also appears to be less favorable than in other countries, calling the widespread deployment of CCS into question. Several gaps were assessed in China's CCS capabilities, particularly in modelling technologies. The question of financing is also thorny; while most Chinese respondents indicated that developed countries should pay for the development of CCS technology, it's unclear how this might occur. Several experts, for example, spoke against inclusion of CCS in the Clean Development Mechanism, an important means of expanding clean technology in China. Perhaps most notably, one workshop speaker assessed the future of CCS as "uncertain," stating that its capabilities are "often assumed, not assessed."

In addition, the STRACO2/COACH project points out several significant issues for international clean technology cooperation. First is the need for robust stakeholder consultation: many in China remain suspicious of CCS. Second, governments will have to engage in significant discussion over intellectual property issues, and ensure that broader industrial and science/technology policy is aligned with clean technology cooperation. Much more attention will also have to be given to the details of financing and incentivization for clean technology.

Finally, the workshop highlighted the utility of person-to-person exchange in enhancing clean technology cooperation. Debbi Seligsohn of the World Resources Institute described a program that gathered an interdisciplinary team of experts from China and the US to explore the various issues involved in CCS deployment, and then organized a US study tour for participants, to be followed soon by a parallel China tour. By linking the people working on the ground in China with their counterparts in the US, the program helped to highlight important issues and challenges in CCS deployment, and stands a good chance of catalyzing long-term international partnerships.

In sum, then, the workshop illustrated several important lessons for international environmental cooperation. First, as China, America, the EU, and other nations struggle to ramp up clean technology deployment, such expert exchange programs will need to become a more common feature of the international landscape. Second, economists and policymakers should prioritize the issues of stakeholder consultation, financing, and intellectual property. CGS has been blessed to witness a sea change in the prospects for international environmental cooperation- but the hard work is yet to come.

Dealing with transboundary water pollution in China

2009-03-22T05:36:00.000-07:00

Most water pollution by nature crosses boundaries; in China, incidents like February's acid leak in Jiangsu indicate the inability of local authorities to deal with contamination. A good recent post on water security by Ma Jun on China Dialogue reports that, on average, there's an environmental incident in China once every two days, 70% of which involve water pollution. A delegate to China's People's Political Consultative Committee highlighted the trans-boundary water pollution issue by calling for the development of a compensation system, a first step toward establishing clear liability for water polluters.

The delegate, also the Vice-President of Anhui University, Wu Cunmei, noted that it is impossible to prevent contaminated water from flowing through watersheds. The national government should, Wu said, quickly establish a dispute-resolution and compensation mechanism for transboundary water pollution (see China Environment Report, in Chinese only).

As Wu noted, regions near the headwaters of river systems often garner economic benefits by polluting watersheds for downstream users, who must bear the costs themselves. This kind of "local protectionism," (地方保护主义) Wu said, damages the whole national system for preventing water pollution, making it an imperative to develop new mechanisms for transboundary dispute resolution and compensation.

None of this is really news, but it's heartening to hear a delegate to one of China's important "two meetings" (两会) speak so forcefully about environmental protection, and to single out watersheds for the development of an eco-compensation framework. Many experts agree that eco-compensation is particularly suitable for use in watersheds, where the benefits of clean water are clear for both upstream and downstream users (see previous post). Providing local governments with a means to "sue" other jurisdictions might also provide a potent secondary-enforcement mechanism, by deterring areas that may be tempted to adopt lax enforcement.

Nonetheless, creating a robust compensation and dispute-resolution system will be thorny. As long as local officials are rewarded chiefly for effecting economic growth, there will be strong incentives to "pass the cost along" by allowing industry to pollute with minimal enforcement and mitigation (see previous post). Moreover, a compensation regime should be carefully designed to encourage watershed management, not just to compensate downstream users for pollution. It's difficult to include the benefits of, for example, preserving forest cover near river system headwaters in any compensation regime.

Here's an opportunity for an enterprising NGO (or even friendly foreign government?) to step in and offer to provide expertise to the Chinese government in constructing a durable watershed pollution compensation and dispute resolution mechanism. As water scarcity increases and the pollution problem becomes more ingrained, China's leadership will surely be grateful for all the help they can get.

More mixed messages on climate as NPC Continues

2009-03-11T20:33:00.000-07:00

Given the importance of China's annual National People's Congress (NPC), it's worth expanding on yesterday's post to cover a few other signs of the direction China's climate policy will take in the coming year.

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told the NPC that China will continue its efforts to increase energy efficiency, thereby decreasing greenhouse gas emissions. In particular, Wen said, ""We will implement energy-conserving measures for power generators, boilers, automobiles, air-conditioners and lighting products" (see Xinhua). The official English-language news article covering Wen's speech also carried quotations from several government officials vowing that environmental protection efforts will continue despite the economic crisis.

A China Daily editorial painted a similarly robust picture of China's efforts to reduce emissions, gushing that

Reducing carbon emissions by weaning industries off oil will not only "green the globe" but also spur growth, spark an employment boom and help combat climate change. And China is best poised to not only effect the new deal but also to reap the benefits of it.

The editorial even gave a nod to the positive atmosphere surrounding US-China climate cooperation by claiming that "As US President Barack Obama's administration pushes for an economy that provides both economic and environmental security, China can ride and contribute to the potential lush wave of inventions and initiatives." This kind of perspective is, of course, what CGS has always pushed for.

One more positive piece of news comes from a member of China's People's Political Consultative Committee, Zhang Guobao. Zhang, noting that Obama has devoted a large portion of America's economic stimulus package to developing new energy sources, called for China should do the same. "If we continue not to take new energy seriously," Zhang warned, "I predict that in another ten years we will be in the same situation as Japan" when it comes to that country's dependency on imported energy (see Renmin Ribao, in Chinese only).

On the other side of the coin, a recent editorial in China Daily exemplifies the old "don't blame China" school of thought when it comes to climate issues. Entitled "Don't blame China for the world's eco-woes," the editorial complained that

Critics still blame China as it builds new cities with modern homes, running water, sewage systems, transport infrastructure, schools and hospitals, just as their countries did. They blame China as it serves the needs of hundreds of millions of farmers moving from the land to the cities in the biggest urbanization program in human history. No nation has ever had to do this before, and the challenges are highly complicated.

There's some truth to this complaint (see previous post), but the real tragedy is that anyone, either in China or abroad, still thinks of the climate issue as a blame game. We're all responsible for changing the planet's carbon balance (though admittedly to differing degrees), and we'll all bear the consequences. The fact is, times have changed and nobody, in China, the United States, or elsewhere, can build new cities without making them sustainable.

Nonetheless, this kind of retrograde thinking appears to be winning out when it comes to China's stance on climate. The leadership appears to be consumed with concerns over jobs, stability, and restive minorities. When it comes to the low-hanging fruit and the "general principle" of climate sustainability, Beijing appears to be committed. But when it comes to making hard decisions, and paying a price, the message appears much more mixed.

Once again, it seems to CGS that foreign leadership will be crucial. The pieces cited above all reference Washington's actions in pushing green stimulus. If America can figure out how to drive economic growth with climate-sustainable features, you can bet that there will be plenty of receptive ears at next year's NPC.

Mixed messages on environment as National People's Congress convenes

2009-03-10T19:33:00.000-07:00

Every March, China's National People's Congress (NPC), the nation's highest legislative body, convenes in Beijing to ratify the decisions of the nation's leadership. It is often an occasion to announce major shifts in policy, and so it's an important context in which to consider discourse on environmental protection. On the basis of two admittedly incomplete measures, the message is very mixed: while official media continues to highlight the severity of environmental issues, the portion of China's economic stimulus package devoted to environmental protection has decreased.

This week's China Daily includes a number of articles devoted to environmental issues, including one entitled "Innovation needed in alternative energy field," and another noting that "Sino-US talks turning to action" on climate change. The former article editorialized that "developing a low-carbon economic is a must as China continues to industrialize, not only for the nation's energy security, but also as part of an urgent international responsibility to address global climate change." This language, from two professors of public administration at Hunan University, is a noticeable shift from the standard government position that tackling climate change should be a developed-nation task. The latter article, depicting joint US-China efforts to improve energy efficiency, emphasized the co-benefits that could result from greater collaboration on energy matters. In general, the message seemed to be that environmental sustainability must remain a central goal of government policy, and that China should see action on environmental issues as part of its responsibilities as an emerging global power.

Sadly, this welcome news did not seem to be reflected where the rubber meets the road. According to China Environmental Law Blog and Caijing, the percentage of China's economic stimulus package to be devoted to environmental efforts is set to decrease. The amount of stimulus money devoted to "sustainable environment" will decline by over 120 billion RMB, with most of that amount being redirected to social welfare spending.

It's understandable to redirect stimulus money to ease the economic pain being faced by so many laid-off workers in China (and indeed, around the world). But this "readjustment" indicates just how difficult it will be for leaders around the world to implement green stimulus packages. As is so often the case, short-term economic considerations and long-term environmental sustainability stand at political odds.

Nonetheless, international coordination and consultation on implementing green stimulus could help governments keep their stimulus packages relatively green. Because initiatives to create green jobs and expand clean energy have never been attempted at such large scales, sharing best practices is a natural way for governments to enhance international financial and environmental cooperation (see previous post).

Here's to hoping Beijing, Washington, and governments around the world can their acts together and push green stimulus packages even as legislators push narrow self-interest.

CGS on vacation

2009-02-27T05:35:00.000-08:00

CGS will be on vacation all next week to attend the "Fulbright Research Forum" in Hong Kong. Please help keep us up to date on important events, reports, etc in the coming days.

Momentum on US-China climate cooperation builds; Tsinghua holds "Overcoming Obstacles to US-China Cooperation on Climate Change" Seminar

2009-02-27T04:56:00.000-08:00

Following Secretary of State Clinton's visit to Beijing, Ken Lieberthal, co-author of a landmark Brookings Institution report on US-China climate cooperation, headlined a seminar at Tsinghua University on overcoming obstacles to such cooperation. This post offers a brief re-cap of the seminar, and goes on to note some of the ripple effects of Clinton's visit. In general, it's fair to say there's a lot of momentum in US-China climate cooperation; the challenge will be to sustain it even as both countries plunge further into recession.

Dr. Lieberthal mainly elaborated on one of the report's main findings, that climate cooperation should be seen as central to the US-China relationship. Secretary Clinton, Lieberthal noted, raised the climate issue in almost every meeting she had during her visit to Beijing. Washington should sustain this emphasis, Lieberthal continued, and see bilateral climate cooperation as the motor for global action. US-China climate cooperation should in turn be part of a shift in the bilateral relationship which views China as a strategic partner on a range of global issues, as opposed to merely regional ones like North Korea.

Lieberthal was also emphatic that Chinese leaders should understand that their willingness to offer concrete steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions directly impacts Washington's ability to do the same; the chief opposition argument to US action is that it will make no difference unless China takes similar steps. Such political arguments also obscure real advantages in strengthening US-China climate collaboration. Lieberthal cited in particular the relative advantages of using China for clean technology demonstration projects: in America, a carbon capture and sequestration plant requires a 6-year permitting process; in China, the time period is less than 2 years.

The reactions of Chinese panelists, including former People's Congress leader Cheng Siwei and Tsinghua professor Hu Angang, broadly fit under the "cautious optimism" paradigm (see previous post). Cheng agreed that trust and dialogue is essential, but went on to reiterate the familar talking points regarding historical emissions, China's developing country status, and the "embedded carbon" in making exports for the West (this is clearly a spurious argument; see China Environmental Law on this).

Hu was a bit bolder, noting that "If the US does not succeed [in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions], neither will China." Hu also called climate change an integral consideration for 21-st century economic development policy, and called the creation of a green economy an opportunity for China to "leapfrog" the most carbon-intensive stages of economic growth. The US and China have shared dreams, said Hu, including a "green dream." Perhaps most consequentially, Hu argued that China should see action on climate change as part of its responsibility as a global power and leader in the world.

Such positivity was broadly, if more cautiously, echoed across the Chinese bureaucracy. The deputy chief of China's National Energy Administration told a US-China forum on energy efficiency that "The two countries could further cooperate on a wide range of areas in the development of economic and energy sectors against the background of economic globalization" (see Xinhua). China Daily issued a sunny report on the Tsinghua seminar, before concluding with a cautious quotation from Cheng: "Dialogues on climate change are in the interest of both China and the US, but each side should work out a plan to combat climate change according to different national conditions."

Meanwhile, China's National Statistics Bureau announced that the nation's energy intensity fell 4.59% in 2008, slightly higher than predicted (see Xinhua). While this is a step forward, the number more than anything else indicates the scale of the task confronting US-China climate cooperation. China Environmental Law has an excellent post on this, so CGS will do no more than to conclude by saying we must hope that the Hu-Lieberthal view of climate cooperation as a strategic and central issue is sustained over time. It really is nothing less than a test of both nation's ability to be responsible partners in the international community- in America's case, after eight years of reckless unilateralism, and in China's case, as part of coming to terms with becoming an economic giant.

Jiangsu acid leak exposes another hole in China's environmental enforcement apparatus

2009-02-25T20:12:00.000-08:00

Coming right on the heels of northern China's severe drought, another environmental disaster has gripped newspaper headlines: "Toxic water scare leaves a sour taste" (see China Daily). Water supply to more than 200,000 residents of Yancheng, Jiangsu province, was disrupted after carbolic acid was found to have contaminated the city's water system. Carbolic acid can damage the central nervous system as well as the kidneys and heart.

Local officials claimed to have inspected the water supply and found nothing amiss, but reports from residents suggest a longer-term pattern of incompetence and denial. According to the article,

Petitions calling for action by the government [to curb water pollution] also went unanswered, said fellow villager Zhou Weixiang, who added: "The factory is said to have contributed a lot to the local tax revenue. We could do nothing about it."

None of this is terribly surprising. Local governments are often blamed for severe lapses in environmental monitoring and enforcement (see previous post). But as one in a string of environmental disasters to hit China in recent months, CGS considers that the Jiangsu incident should persuade Beijing that it is right to be worried about environmental discontent in the Year of the Ox (see previous post).

Sino-American green stimulus; or, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) Report: "Strengthening US-China Climate Engagement"

2009-02-24T18:48:00.001-08:00

The US-based environmental NGO Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) has recently released a report on strengthening US-China climate "engagement." The report comes on the heels of similar reports issued by the Brookings Institution and the Asia Society (see previous post), and contains many of the same observations and recommendations. Nonetheless, the report frames US-China climate cooperation in a slightly different way, which deserves further commentary.

More so than the other two reports, NRDC observes that the US and China are taking parallel tracks when it comes to investing a large portion of their respective economic stimulus efforts in green efforts. This is new to both governments, and yet the objective, in terms of creating green jobs and expanding the use of green technologies, is remarkably similar. It only makes sense, then, for Washington and Beijing to coordinate the green components of their stimulus packages. NRDC, for example, recommends the creation of a "green jobs forum" to share lessons learned (p 3). It's a good idea, and in principle there's no reason why there shouldn't be a high-level and wide-ranging discussion between the two governments on what works and what doesn't when it comes to green stimulus. Coordination between the two countries could also lead to synergistic investment in specific, highly promising areas of clean technology research and develelopment.

Of course, economic stimulus is politically charged in both countries, and there's a limit to how willing either government will be in disclosing failures to use public money to good effect. In the United States, Washington may take some hits from the political right for talking to China when many Americans are still hurting from the flight of manufacturing across the Pacific. But high-level consultation and coordination between the American and Chinese green stimulus packages is still worth trying.

The NRDC report also suggests one other intriguing idea. Noting that China often lacks the capacity to accurately report its greenhouse gas emissions, the report recommends that the US offer technical assistance to bolster emissions monitoring capabilities (p 11). CGS is tempted to take this one step further, and argue that the US and China should work towards joint reporting of annual national greenhouse gas emissions.

But wait, you may say. Beijing would never go for that, and statistic ambiguity is a time-tested instrument in the government's toolkit. True. But think of the benefits: joint reporting would necessarily bind US and Chinese emissions reductions efforts together. Moreover, it's hard to think of a better way to build mutual trust in the climate arena than to commit to joint, transparent reporting. Finally, joint monitoring could help to bolster emissions data collection and monitoring in both countries, and enhance climate science cooperation.

A coordinated stimulus and joint monitoring are medium-term objectives. In the meantime, several initial steps are of greater importance (see previous post). But in the face of climate change, it's necessary to think boldly and strategically. In this vein, the NRDC report provides some enticing new food for thought.

Approval of foreign investment in China to be linked to environmental index

2009-02-24T02:14:00.000-08:00

In a notable step, China's Commerce Ministry announced late last week that approval of "foreign-funded enterprises" will now be based in part on an "environmental protection index" and a "land-use intensity index." According to Xinhua, the environmental index "will include capital input in the areas of environmental protection, annual sulfur dioxide emission and chemical oxygen demand." The land-use intensity index, meanwhile, "will include gross fixed-asset investment and the total area of land used, as well as a breakdown of how that land is used -- for example, for buildings, residential facilities or 'green' areas."

This new regulation, announced jointly by the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) and the Ministry for Environmental Protection (MEP), requires foreign-funded enterprises to submit assessments on these factors prepared by local environmental protection departments. Again according to Xinhua, the regulation is intended to "tighten scrutiny of energy-intensive and polluting facilities funded by foreign investments."

It's a little hard to read this particular regulation. Broadly, it seems like a promising step, but there are obvious difficulties with ensuring uniform enforcement of the regulation. The fact that local governments will prepare the environmental index assessments does nothing to address the rampant corruption that usually attends foreign investment approval at the local level. Nonetheless, given the level of foreign investment in China, the regulation could have a significant impact in terms of forcing foreign investors to pay more attention to China's environmental regulations. The capital input criterion is a clear reference to China's efforts to create a low-resource-intensity economy. The land-use intensity requirement may also help to reduce tensions in areas where industrial development is eating up valuable farmland. At a deeper level, this regulation, and the coordination between MOC and MEP, seems to bode well for MEP's stature relative to other, more established state ministries.

On two points, the regulation is a little disturbing. Most importantly, it says nothing about greenhouse gas emissions, though this isn't surprising given China's hesitancy to take any action that may disadvantage its own industry. Second, the regulation, in applying only to foreign-funded firms, carries a whiff of green protectionism. CGS would never, of course, argue that such firms are entitled to shirk Chinese environmental regulations, but one would hope that this regulation does not signal any less stringent enforcement of environmental regulations for state-owned enterprises or private domestic firms.

Clinton's Visit

2009-02-22T20:12:00.000-08:00

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gets two thumbs up for her handling of the climate issue in Beijing. It's worth taking a little step back to think how far we've come in recent months. Just two months ago, the United States demonstrated its familiar reticence to take a leading role of climate at talks in Poznan (see previous post). But when she arrived in Beijing, Clinton placed the climate issue front and center, telling China "we hope you don't make the same mistakes we made" on climate. She also made a smart move in framing the climate issue as one that threatens the security of both nations, saying "This not a matter of politics or morality or right or wrong,” he said. “It is simply the unforgiving math of accumulating emissions” (see New York Times). Indeed, Clinton even went so far as to participate on a webchat, asking China's 300 million Internet users to "work together for a clean energy future" (see China Daily).

China's response to this welcome overture has been one of cautious optimism. China's Foreign Minister pledged that the economic crisis would not derail the country's greenhouse gas emissions reduction efforts, a welcome sign of confidence in the seriousness of the issue. ""The government's resolve to tackle climate change has not changed, and our actions have not weakened," the Minister said, before pledging that "We are willing to work together with the international community to push the Copenhagen talks forward and make sure they yield a positive result" (see China Daily). Elsewhere, however, China's government sought to emphasize the necessity of technology transfer if climate cooperation is to be enhanced. An official at the Ministry of Science and Technology was quoted as saying "China is glad to see that the US has started to take concrete action [on US-China climate cooperation]. But without funding and technology, cooperation would end up as empty talk" (see China Daily). The official went on to reference Beijing's familiar developing-country argument that it is unable to take on concrete GHG reduction targets (see previous post).

Beijing's hesitancy points towards the next step for a promising re-invigoration of US-China climate cooperation. The US and China must come to an agreement about technology transfer and financing the deployment of GHG mitigation technology. Chinese academic Zhang Haibin writes that "Hostility toward Communism excludes China from receiving official development aid from the United States, which could significantly hasten climate-change-related projects" (see New York Times), while a recent essay by Chinese environmental experts notes that international transfer of clean technologies remains underdeveloped (see China Dialogue).

In sum, then, Clinton's push on climate can be considered a success. The real work, though, lies ahead. As Zhang's statement indicates, Washington must build on its climate overture with a series of confidence-building measures to indicate its seriousness, including adopting binding emissions restrictions itself. It must also put its money where its mouth is on technology transfer- something that, particularly in the midst of economic crisis, is an unmistakable sign of conviction to tackle climate change through Sino-American partnership. Two smaller steps will be crucial to achieving these larger goals. First, China and the US need to reaffirm and expand the dialogue on climate and energy established under the Strategic Economic Dialogue (see previous post). Second, a joint task force should be formed at once to overcome the technical obstacles to technology transfer, most crucially intellectual property rights (see previous post).

As these steps are taken, Washington should also make clear to China that it expects reciprocation. The climate and energy dialogue should state at the outset that the ultimate outcome of US-China climate cooperation must be for China to reduce its GHG emissions by a set amount, within the framework of an equitable global agreement that promotes sustainable economic development. All this lies ahead. But it's nonetheless a huge achievement to be underway on the road towards a genuinely sustainable future.

Chinese scientists blame early spring on climate change

2009-02-19T06:24:00.000-08:00

China's National Meteorological Center isn't pulling any punches: in a statement released early this week, scientists at the Center blamed global warming for rising temperatures and the early coming of spring. See China Daily (nod to Climate Progress for first pointing this out).

We can only hope this helps spread awareness of the potential ramifications of climate change for China.

Climate Sustainability: Getting from here to there

2009-02-19T06:20:00.000-08:00

Climate Progress published an excellent piece on how to ramp up wind, biomass cofiring, and energy efficiency efforts to start reducing US greenhouse gas emissions in the near-term- and without resorting to unproven technologies, nuclear, or clean(er) coal. Well worth a read, and let's hope those designing the US-China climate cooperation architecture take a look as well.

Good news for environmental regionalism in China- and sustainable development in Tibet

2009-02-19T05:58:00.000-08:00

One of China Greenspace's favorite causes is environmental regionalism in China (see previous posts on international cooperation and regional environmental protection).

It's good news, then that China's Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is embarking on its "first large scale river basin enforcement campaign," which will cover the Yangtze and 10 tributaries (see China Environmental Law Blog). This kind of regional approach makes a lot of sense, particularly for watersheds (see previous post on Payment for Ecosystem Services for more on this). But the whole point of regionalism is that it liberates local authorities from central control, so we'll have to see whether MEP's role is more as coordinator or more as autocrat.

In addition, a recent post from China Dialogue offers some nice lessons about community-based sustainable development in Tibet. These lessons are worth a read, especially since they seem relevant to environmental protection in traditional-society contexts elsewhere in the world.

More words on water and climate change

2009-02-17T18:37:00.000-08:00

Following yesterday's CGS post on water scarcity and security, Green Leap Forward has produced an excellent report on the primary policy and ecological issues surrounding water scarcity in China. Green Leap Forward also highlights an important paper on the relationship between energy and water resources in sustaining China's economic development. CGS agrees with Green Leap Forward that the paper is worth reading in its entirety, but one conclusion seems particularly striking:

By two orders of magnitude, agriculture has the lowest output per unit of direct water use of any sector in the Chinese economy aside from water production and supply... Allowing water to migrate out of agriculture and into higher value added uses will be a necessary condition for sustaining growth in the Chinese economy. (p 11-12)

Diverting a greater share of China's water resources to non-agricultural uses would have enormous political and social implications. While it may be economically and ecologically sensible, such a move does not mesh well with the current leadership's emphasis on rural issues, nor its concern for rising social discontent. The first, necessary step would appear to be water price reform, but even this tentative step seems politically infeasible at present. Nonetheless, if the climate models referenced in yesterday's post are halfway correct, China will have to face these stark realities.

Speaking of stark realities, a recent post from Climate Progress provides another sobering reminder (if one were needed) of the consequences of continued growth in greenhouse gas emissions. Citing a recent study by Danish scientists, the post reports that

Under the worst scenario, warmer seas and a slowdown of ocean circulation would lower marine oxygen levels, creating “dead zones” that could not support fish, shellfish and other higher forms of marine life — and may not revive for 1,500 to 2,000 years.

Let's just stop to ponder that number for a moment: 2000 years. The scale of the climate change problem never ceases to boggle the mind. But these two posts also provide a sobering reminder of the necessity to get to work.

US-China Environmental Cooperation as a Security Issue

2009-02-16T00:52:00.001-08:00

Last week, CGS was summoned to coffee by a friend who works within China's environmental protection bureaucracy. The government, said friend confessed, is very worried about the intersection of the economic crisis, political discontent, and its environmental policy goals. Officials, according to this source, are increasingly concerned both that economic considerations might imperil China's transition to a low-carbon economy (低碳经济), and that public discontent over pollution and other environmental issues may translate into protests or worse.

They should be, and said friend's warning provides an impetus to explain why US-China environmental cooperation should be seen not only as an ecological, energy, or economic issue, but also as one bearing on the most hard-core realist conceptions of security. (Full disclosure: CGS has often described the field of environmental security as a little dubious).

The most obvious segue from China's environmental situation to security is via energy. China is the world's third-largest oil importer (see US Department of Energy Country Brief), with much of it passing along vulnerable sea routes through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca. China presently lacks the capacity to protect these crucial sea lanes, and thus is vulnerable to disruptions in oil production and transport in South, Southwest, and Southeast Asia. The Brookings Report, referenced in yesterday's post, notes that if China were to expand deployment of renewable and low-carbon energy sources, its energy security would be enhanced, probably also lowering tensions with other major oil consumers such as the United States and India in areas like Africa and Central Asia.

But the most serious security threat to arise from China's environmental situation comes from water scarcity. Most of the major river systems that feed and water China, India, and Southeast Asia depend on meltwater from the Himalayan region. Climate change is endangering this vital source of water for 60% of the human population. Himalayan glaciers, which provide some 70% of the flow of major Asian rivers, are melting at an extremely rapid rate; one study predicts that the Himalayan-Hindu Kush region will "run out of water" during the dry season (Barnett, T.P., et al. “Potential impacts of a warming climate on water availability in snow-dominated regions.” Nature. 438 (2005): 303-308).

Recent news reports from the present drought in northern China provide some indication of what might occur should this nightmare scenario transpire: "Highest Level of Emergency for Drought Declared" (see China Daily) and "2/3 of China's cities short of water" (see Renminribao, in Chinese only). The present dought, of course, cannot be conclusively tied to climate change, and is exacerbated by wasteful water use in China's northern regions. But as climate change accelerate, we can expect things to get worse.

The security implications for a China, India, and Southeast Asia short of water are obvious. Besides destabilizing massive and volatile populations, such a situation would interrupt economic growth in the very regions economists agree are central to global recovery. In a time when the head of America's Central Intelligence Agency identified unemployment as the primary threat to American security (see New York Times), it's frightening to contemplate a similar situation compounded by thirst for the majority of the human population.

US-China environmental cooperation, then, isn't just an ecological concern. It's not only good for economic growth or mutual understanding. It's also essential for the security of both nations. Combined, these rationales amount not only to a compelling case for investing heavily in US-China environmental cooperation, but a clear imperative. The world must figure out how to grow sustainably without poisioning its environmental commons, and especially its atmosphere. The United States and China must lead the way, otherwise we will all soon be living nastier, more brutal, and shorter lives- a Hobbesian security threat if ever there were one.

The future of US-China climate cooperation

2009-02-15T04:52:00.000-08:00

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will soon arrive in Beijing, with energy and climate to figure high on the agenda (see previous post). Two excellent reports from the Asia Society and the Brookings Institution provide a fine illustration of what should be done as Washington and Beijing begin to take the climate crisis seriously. China Environmental Law Blog provides a thorough commentary on both reports; this post will thus not attempt to summarize, instead making only a few additional comments.

As both reports note, one important driver of US-China energy and climate cooperation is the high proportion of coal in each country's energy mix. Both reports thus single out clean(er) coal technologies as being priority areas for enhanced technology collaboration. In particular, the Asia Society report recommends that the US Department of Energy's FutureGEN program to build an integrated gassification-combined cycle coal demonstration plant in China be accelerated (p 30). This is sensible, but it's important that neither the Chinese nor the American side lose sight of the ultimate goal of transforming the energy infrastructure, rather than simply trying to make coal clean(er). Ultimately, coal is not a sustainable energy source, and as a recent Greenpeace report makes clear, its environmental externalities in China are matched by others in health.

One major emphasis in both reports is on supporting sub-national initiatives, something CGS has consistently championed (see previous post). The Asia Society report notes that in the US, energy efficiency standards have been most effectively implemented at the state and local level; the Brookings report similarly notes the dynamism and vitality of local initiatives to combat climate change. It's clear that the sub-national level should receive substantial attention in an expanded US-China climate cooperation agenda. The Asia Society report further delves into cooperative training, recommending (p 42) that

A cooperative training program for the next generation of interdisciplinary energy
and climate specialists in China and the United States should be promoted to develop
technical expertise and promote mutual understanding.

This is an important idea, and it deserves particular attention. The US government already funds a number of programs designed to accomplish similar goals, including the Fulbright program, which supports this author. Creating a dedicated, Fulbright-like program to encourage US-China collaboration targets money where it's most needed: where scientists and technicians labor at the ground level to create sustainable energy alternatives. Even a small such program can reap massive benefits in terms of human capital enhancements on both sides.

Such a program can also have a small but meaningful impact on another key challenge confronting US-China climate cooperation: mutual distrust. The Brookings report insightfully emphasizes the depth of this mistrust, including the widespread Chinese suspicion that US pressure on climate is part of a strategy to "keep China down." This suspicion is amplified by the related Chinese concern that its economy is being locked into a pollution-intensive, low-value industrial niche from which it will be difficult to escape. Indeed, these insights explain a great deal about the state of US-China climate talks so far, and kudos to Brookings for emphasizing these crucial political contexts.

The Brookings report also provides a helpful insight for conceptualizing the institutional and governance challenges confronting climate issues in China. It's best, says the Brookings report, to think of sociopolitical China as a group of relatively developed urban islands, with a total population of 400 million, scattered amidst a sea of poor agriculturalists who total 800 million. China's leaders struggle to understand the depth of this sea. This conceptualization strikes me as a more subtle, intelligent framework than the "state policy breaks down at the local level" model that typically characterizes Western analytical descriptions of Chinese environmental policy. Even China's leaders, the Brookings report suggests, don't fully understand what's going on, a suggestion that meshes well with observations from the ground here in China.

While the report says relatively little about how to overcome this challenge, it's clear that a lot of attention will have to be given to institutional and political capacity building in US-China climate cooperation. Something that should be emphasized are the benefits that can be gained by giving local jurisdictions leeway to develop their own solutions to environmental problems. As explored in a prior post on China's environmental regionalism, delegating authority and responsibility for environmental protection, rather than ceaselessly trying to tighten the center's grip, may help to work around the capacity problem. The US has a great deal of experience in this kind of "environmental federalism," and could contribute a great deal to developing more autonomous environmental protection institutions in China.

In sum, these two reports are smart and subtle outlines of how the US and China can work together to address the greatest challenge of our time. They are particularly valuable in indicating how framing and context matters: climate and energy cooperation also requites work to diffuse Beijing's mistrust of American intentions. But this commentator for one is sadly skeptical that leaders on both sides will fully grasp the potential and imperative for US-China climate cooperation. One avenue, largely unexplored (though referenced by Brookings) in these two reports, is to frame such cooperation primarily as a security issue. That will be the subject of CGS's next post.

Some brief words on ecological resilience to climate change

2009-02-10T21:17:00.000-08:00

In one of the more colorful recent developments in the global climate change debate, New York Times reporter Andy Rivkin reports that the identification of an extinct giant snake has fed a debate over the ecological consequences of warming, particularly in the tropics.

Recently discovered vertebrae fossil remains indicate that the 60 million year old snake, termed "Titanoboa," was more than 40 feet long and weighed over a ton. More importantly, however, this giant thrived in a tropical environment with estimated average annual temperatures of 75-79 degrees, significantly higher than in modern times. This finding has been interpreted by some commentators to suggest that ecosystems are more resilient in the face of significantly higher temperatures than previously thought. In addition, Titanoboa has added to the debate over whether the climate system includes a "tropical thermostat" which helps to regulate temperatures in tropical regions. This second debate has significant implications, because the existence of a functional thermostat may ameliorate warming.

Rivkin's post on this issue is well worth a read, both because it encapsulates an important part of the climate debate, and because it includes a pretty awesome artist's depiction of the terrifying Titanoboa.

Exciting Times for US-China Climate Cooperation

2009-02-10T21:02:00.000-08:00

After a New Year holiday, CGS is back in action, energized by several important developments in the field of US-China climate cooperation. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will soon arrive in China, and New York Times environment correspondent Andy Rivkin reports that "climate and energy will be high on the agenda."

There will plenty to discuss. The Brookings Institution and the Asia Society have both recently issued major reports probing the way forward for US-China climate cooperation. In the meantime, China is in the process of formulating a new Energy Law and its 12th Five Year Plan for Energy (see China Environmental Law Blog on this).

CGS will be back in the coming days with a fuller analysis of all these developments, but in the meantime, suffice it to say that the coming weeks will be a crucial period for US-China climate cooperation. One can safely say without resorting to hyperbole that the sustainable future we all crave may well hang in the balance.

China's Eco-Civilization (生态文明)

2009-01-24T01:27:00.000-08:00

This past week, CGS wrote a post describing China's "new road" environmental policy. In that post, CGS questioned whether China is seeking to change the orientation of its environmental policy. That question is probed further in this post, which analyzes a speech given by Ministry of Environmental Protection Vice-Minister Pan Yue at the "High-Level Summit on the 30th Anniversary of Reform and Opening and Environmental Protection," a speech entitled "China's Traditional Ecological Knowledge Influences Westerners" (中华传统的生态智慧影响西方人, in Chinese only).

Pan opens the speech reflecting on the number of Westerners who seek to understand ecological knowledge through studying Daoism, Confucianism, and other Chinese philosophical and religious systems. Pan asserts that these traditions impart a unique capacity for ecological thought to modern Chinese society ("为什么中华民族能够独自延续生存到今天？就是因为我们的文化理念蕴含着更加深刻的生态智慧，我们的伦理与制度充满着这种深刻的生态智慧，我们的生活方式实践着这种深刻的生态智慧，我们的历史传统延续着这种深刻的生态智慧.") Such traditions, Pan says, have entrenched concepts like "harmony" and "temperence" in Chinese society, and form the basis for a Chinese "ecological civilization" ("这些价值观在现实制度和生活中具体落实为一个“度”。“度”就是分寸，就是节制，就是礼数，就是平衡，就是和谐…“度”不仅是中国的政治智慧，也是中国人的生活智慧，更是中国生态智慧的凝练表达。")

This ecological civilization, according to Pan, entails the curtailing of material ambitions and desires. With this check in place, ecological civilization can "correct all the repeated missteps of nihilism and consumerism brought by Western industrial civilization" ("...不追求物质享受的最大化，而是追求生命之美和人生意境，使得生态文明中的日常生活超越了现实的功利追求...这种从容有度的生活方式通过节制人的无限欲望，进而追求充实饱满的精神境界。有了这一境界，就能使我们辨析、纠正西方工业文明所带来的消费主义和虚无主义的重重迷误.")

Thus positioned, Pan's Chinese ecological civilization is poised to be the next phase of socioeconomic development, following agricultural and industrial civilization. Indeed, says Pan, China's Confucian traditions make it the natural wellspring of this new ecological civilization, ("中国的现代化建设已经完成了救亡图存的历史使命，一个承载千年道统的政治民族最终屹立于世界东方，这是中国建设生态文明的政治基础；充满生态智慧的中华道统在现代社会实现创造性转化，这是中国建设生态文明的思想文化基础。因此，中国完全有条件、有能力实现人类三期文明的跨越式发展.") Intriguingly, Pan also suggests that economic modernization (the kind which has brought so much environmental destruction) provided part of the economic and political basis on which to build ecological civilization.

CGS finds much of interest in this speech. Most glaringly, what would a Chinese eco-civilization look like? Pan seems to suggest it would be a natural outgrowth of traditional Chinese thought and culture. Indeed, Pan's ecological vision almost seems to be a nationalistic one. Of course, too much shouldn't be made of Pan's speech in terms of concrete policy, but it is interesting to comment on these subtleties. 　　

China and the Climate Issue under Obama

2009-01-20T23:21:00.000-08:00

President Obama's Inaugural Address, delivered yesterday, was music to the ears of those who care about climate change. As Climate Progress notes, Obama included a remarkable call "to nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say that we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders, nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect."

It's as if he had magically gathered all the anguished pleas from scientists, academics, environmentalists, and common folk over the past decade to act on climate, and made of them a poem. The time is now, and the most powerful man in the world gets it. With renewed spirit, this post looks again at the prospects for a new global climate deal that includes China.

The Necessity for US Leadership in Securing China's Cooperation

A few weeks ago, CGS wrote about an essay by a Chinese academic, Zhang Haibin, expressing optimism for progress on the climate issue under Obama. The greatest impediment to China's participation, wrote Zhang, is lack of American leadership. The consequences of this failure are elaborated in an excellent review of China's climate policy written by scholar Tu Jianjun:

Chinese policymakers and academia generally weigh GHG emissions control as significant liabilities instead of potential assets to the national economy. Such perceptions were reinforced by the outgoing Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 and most of Annex I countries’ failure to meet their Kyoto commitments. Beijing has already expressed it’s belief that any mandatory emission cap would unfairly limit the nation's economic growth. Thus, rejecting mandatory emissions caps will be the bottom line for Beijing’s climate policy in the foreseeable future. Ironically, although the U.S. government used the absence of key developing countries as an excuse to justify its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the sudden disappearance of U.S. pressure on China in 2001 actually made it possible for Beijing to maintain a “wait and see” climate policy for quite a while.

In contrast, Tu goes on to note, a joint US-EU push would likely cajole Beijing into accepting greenhouse gas emissions reductions. As he puts it, "If developed nations as a whole could meet their GHG reduction commitments, it is not unimaginable that China may eventually accept an intensity-based mandatory GHG reduction target." Tu's argument, then, serves simply to underline the importance of American leadership in getting China to be part of a global climate deal. On the climate issue, at least, it seems many in China will be taking their cues from Washington in the coming months.

China is Watching

In a notable essay published just before Obama's inauguration entitled "Obama's 'change' can begin with the climate issue," (奥巴马的“变革”可能从气候问题开始, in Chinese only) Tsinghua University scholar Guan Qingyou argues that Obama's climate policy can be the very emboidment of his "change" mantra. Guan outlines a remarkable vision in which President Obama's America becomes a "clean energy superpower," and reclaims the title of global climate leadership from Europe ("...领导美国成为清洁能源大国，并以积极的姿态参与国际气候谈判，从欧洲人手中重新夺回话语权。") Guan draws a sharp distinction between this vision of leadership, and the failed policy of former President Bush ("他还批评了小布什政府的气候变化政策，表示在他的总统任期内他将带领美国重新在气候变化方面承担领导者的角色。")

Perhaps most notably, though, Guan expresses strong support for Obama's vision that a clean economy can also be a prosperous one. The new President's assertion that clean energy deployment can promote economic growth and create jobs, says Guan, is a sound one ("奥巴马认为，清洁能源的开发计划是振兴美国经济的一部分，能够创造出数百万个就业机会，成为美国经济的新的增长点。因此，应对气候变化与振兴经济并不矛盾。这一点笔者倒是非常认同...应对金融危机和气候危机的计划，是可以毕其功于一役的.")

Consensus is emerging among Western nations for strong action on climate change, he argues, and the trend is inexorable ("从澳大利亚到美国，从陆克文到奥巴马，西方大国的政治领袖的观点正越来越趋于一致，即各国政府必须采取措施遏制和适应全球气候变化的趋势"). The climate cause has become a global one, Guan says, and suggests that it has ceased to be a factual issue, instead becoming a matter of politics ("气候变化问题实在也已经很难再称之为有争议的科学问题了，而成为一种世界潮流、价值观或者说“宗教”。在这样的背景下，谈论气候变化问题便有了一个“政治正确性”的问题“）。

Given this reality, Guan writes, the world will await America's metamorphasis. It's up to America, he suggests, to prove to the world that economic growth and climate sustainability can go hand in hand. If it succeeds in articulating this, a true model for sustainable development, Guan indicates that China will be all ears ("尽管改变现状阻力重重，但变革的远期依然值得期待。至少从这点看，奥巴马所宣扬的“变革”意义深远而重大。既然如此，我们是不是也该学习一下奥巴马的雄心壮志？")

The Necessity of Now

So America has its marching orders to lead the world into a new era of climate cooperation, one which includes China. But some new research lends further impetus to begin the process without delay. A new paper from Harvard's Kennedy School argues that China's emissions growth will be faster than predicted, probably putting atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration stabilization targets out of reach within a decade or two, making China's participation on a global deal even more crucial (However, lower economic growth may slow emissions growth- see previous post). A separate, economic analysis of various climate agreement models indicated that, from a "cost and enforceability standpoint, GHG stabilization at 450 ppm for CO2 only (a common standard) is hardly achievable." If these analyses prove to be correct, the politics of climate agreements, never simple, are likely to become almost impossibly complicated.

Once More Into the Breech, Dear Friends...

Obama was right to call for a new era of responsibility. As individuals, nations, and societies, we must become more aware of our responsibilities to one another. Only with respect to the common principle of responsibility does it make sense to save an intangible climate, and indeed, to save eachother. 人人都有责。