China's emissions to peak in 2030! (?)

CGS woke up today to a Reuters report that some of China's leading climate experts urge the adoption of policies to make the county's carbon dioxide emissions growth to slow by 2020, and to peak by 2030. The suggestion, made in a report signed by many heavy-weight researchers and policy analysts, urges the government to consider a variety of policies, including a carbon tax and even a domestic cap and trade system, to effectively cap emissions by 2030. Perhaps most notably, the report stresses the need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions within the next few decades in order to avoid catastrophic ecological damage.

The study's authors were careful to note that their analysis is merely a recommendation, and has not been endorsed by policymakers. Yet China's government has signaled in recent weeks that their hard-line position on climate may be softening (see Green Leap Forward). Even if the study really is just a "research exercise," as its authors claim, it's one that marks a sea change in public thinking among the country's elite. Moreover, it's promising that the report stresses the ecological imperatives behind climate change- and the threat to China's development objectives- rather than the tired rhetoric of who's to blame for global aggregate emissions.

But what might it mean in practice? Even if China were to come out with a commitment to peak emissions by 2030, it doesn't mean we're out of the climate woods yet. China's much-touted energy efficiency targets and renewable energy scale-ups have been characterized by statistical fudging and fuzzy math (see, once again, Green Leap Forward). The country desperately needs a robust system for measuring and verifying emissions reductions. In particular, China lacks experience with regulatory frameworks for emissions reduction, as well as both the software and know-how to model emissions reductions- both clear imperatives for international cooperation.

And, of course, the study could simply be a trial balloon that gets shot down by China's higher-ups. But when you're dealing with things as foreboding as climate change, you've got to take comfort where you can, and China's "2050 China Energy and CO2 Emissions Report" at least represents an enlightened and sober view of what China must do to prevent catastrophic atmospheric disruption.

Report from Stern's visit to Beijing

Todd Stern and a US climate cooperation delegation made an appearance at a roundtable discussion at Tsinghua University today, which CGS weaseled itself into. It was "off the record," so to to maintain whatever journalistic integrity it has, CGS will only refer to general comments and threads of discussion (Chatham House rules).

With one exception, a really good, but unattributable quote: "We are mindful of the unforgiving imperative of the atmosphere." Well, CGS for one will sleep a little better knowing that.

Unfortunately, the rules of the game haven't changed: China still emphasizes the need for growth and development, while the US side slowly chips away at China's protests that it is a developing country, noting that China cannot claim to be as helpless in the face of climate change as, say, Haiti.

However, the roundtable did come closer to identifying a key negotiating front than previous sessions: technology cooperation. The Chinese side, possibly because it was dominated by representatives of the energy and engineering bureaucracy, constantly called for technology transfer. The US side forthrightly said that the United States has neither the monetary resources nor the political will to finance China's clean energy transformation: it can purchase the technology on the open market. What's needed, they said, is closer to an equitable (presumably meaning the US won't pay) "technology cooperation" arrangement.

A possible foundation for compromise emerged when Chinese representatives responded by saying that the US can do more to promote development of technologies that meet China's needs as a developing country, something most feasibly done through private-sector partnerships. Governments, meanwhile, can collaborate on enhancing China's capacity for clean technology deployment and implementation, especially in the area of measuring, verifying, and reporting emissions.

That might be something Congress can live with. But one big hurdle remains, and one recognized by both sides: intellectual property (IP). Both sides noted that there's a lot of misunderstanding on this issue, that China is actually better on some IP issues than it's given credit for, and that there's a whole range of technologies, mostly in energy efficiency, where IP issues are not a significant impediment.

So long and short, a focus of continued negotiations should be on capacity building in technology transfer, not simply discussion of the transfer and financing itself. To offer some CGS commentary, the Chinese side didn't seem to be budging much, but that's understandable: at a minimum, the US has to pass domestic cap and trade legislation before China can be expected to make any concessions. But you do have to take a step back and think: a bunch of earnest, capable people all speaking frankly about the importance of US-China climate cooperation for the future of the world. That would have been almost unimaginable a year ago.

Mr. Stern goes to Beijing

Todd Stern, the chief American climate negotiator, arrived yesterday in Beijing for talks meant to pave the way for Copenhagen. The New York Times quoted Congressman Edward Markey, co-sponsor of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, who recently returned from a Beijing trip, as saying, "This is going to be one of the most complex diplomatic negotiations in the history of the world."

It's not too much hyperbole to go even further and say it will also be one of the most important, determining a great deal of the ecological fate of the world this century. Given this importance, what China says and does between Stern's visit and the negotiations at Copenhagen will also signal a great deal about what kind of country China really is, and what kind of power it aspires to become. If it offers sensible concessions and true partnership to the United States, we can be reassured that China wants to buy into a rules-based global order, in which there is a strong presumption of common interest. It would also speak well of China's technocratic regime (though it will be, and should be, forever in the shadow of Mao's totalitarianism and Tiannanmen). If, on the other hand, China sticks to its current talking points, which offer no concrete emissions reduction and continue to blame the West for climate change, we can all grow a lot more concerned about the future of international cooperation.

(See also Julian Wong's excellent summary of what China has done to date on climate change).

Climate change as a security issue for China

CGS has been absent for the last month, having been caught on the wrong side of China's Great Firewall (The twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre was Thursday). CGS has also been working on a paper entitled "Climate Change, Water, and China's National Security," to be presented at a conference in Hong Kong later this month.

Here's what CGS learned and concluded:

China and its neighboring countries are in for several acute water-related impacts as a result of climate change. Some areas of northwest China and eastern India will face severe irrigation challenges as water availability from Himalayan glacial meltwater decreases precipitously by the end of the century. Second, arid regions of China, especially the north, will become even drier. Third, south China and the Mekong delta will come under severe risk of catastrophic flooding. Essentially, most parts of China will have too little water when they need it (the dry season), and too much when they don't (the wet season).

China is fortunate in that it is wealthy enough that it can adapt to many of the worst consequences of these climactic changes. It can build dams and flood control infrastructure to store water and prevent destructive flooding, and it can invest in massive schemes like the South-North Water Transfer project to redress regional water shortages. Even if water shortages threaten crop production in China's breadbasket northern regions, China is wealthy enough that it can import much greater amounts of food.

What is clear is that water-related climate impacts will stress social and political institutions. Yes, China can invest in adaptation, but it will be expensive. Government agencies and the military will be harder pressed to develop response capabilities to water shortages. Meanwhile, water shortages threaten social stability in fragile areas of China, especially Xinjiang. Finally, water issues will become a more prominent feature of China's foreign relations, for which it is currently unprepared and inexperienced.

Climate change does not (obviously) threaten China's security in the same way that Soviet Russia once did, or that (according to the censors...) Twitter does today (it has been blocked for weeks). Rather, it will be an acute stress factor for social and political actors. Add in the many other such stressors (income inequality, economic hardship, political illiberalism, etc), and China will be compelled to pay more attention to climate impacts in the coming years.

Of course, and this is important on the eve of the US climate envoy's visit to China, China wouldn't have to worry so much if it commits to reduce its GHG emissions at Copenhagen this December. CGS believes the enduring value of seeing climate as a strategic issue for China is that it can help compel Beijing to see that climate change will stress China's social and political foundations, and is not simply an economic or ecological issue. Many of the government's great projects, such as the Western Development Project (Xibu da kaifa) will be greatly imperiled by climate impacts.

On an only partially related note:

A brief word on the climate negotiations: I've recently been in several fora where I've gotten into arguments about the necessity of China accepting firm commitments, and it's just this simple: China is too big for it to be an X factor in the global climate equation. Any formula the negotiators come up with in Copenhagen is meaningless unless China's contribution is codified.

CGS knows it's preaching to the choir here, but had to get that off its chest.

Bridging the developed/developing nation divide on climate

One of the thorniest aspects of the global climate problem is how to apportion the burdens of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The old rich world is responsible for the vast majority of historic anthropogenic emissions, but the growth in global emissions comes largely from emerging markets, especially the Indo-Chinese giants.

As a result, scholars and climate experts devote a lot of time to thinking about how to break the deadlock (see previous post). Hu Angang, an economist at Tsinghua University, published an essay recently on China Dialogue that presents an interesting take on the issue, and proposes a new emissions reduction trajectory for China, which will be crucial to the success of the overall global effort to reduce emissions (see Climate Progress).

Essentially, Hu proposes defining four categories for emissions-reduction purposes based on the Human Development Index (HDI): high, medium-high, medium-low, and low. The last two categories would have no responsibility to reduce emissions, while the medium-high group, of which China is a member, would have emissions-reductions targets calculated according to the gap in their HDI value from the high category (0.8 or above on the HDI). These distinctions would also be used to calculate financing of adaptation and technology transfer.

According to Hu's formula, the following roadmap should be set for China:

By 2020 carbon dioxide emissions should have peaked;
By 2030 there should be annual emissions of less than 2.2 billion tonnes (a reduction to 1990 levels).
By 2050 there should be annual emissions of less than 1.1 billion tonnes (half of 1990 levels).

By way of comparison, the US emitted about 1.6 billion tonnes of carbon in 2007 (see article).

Promising as these targets are, what is more significant is Hu's phraseology in promoting them:

China’s international emissions reduction policy is not in step with the world. China is still considered a developing country, with no emissions reduction responsibilities, commitments or contributions toward meeting an international consensus.

A public commitment to reduce emissions, backed by central government targets, would be a massive spur to domestic emissions cuts. Participation in international climate-change negotiations and adopting climate-change regulations can provide the opportunity to implement of a beneficial energy and climate policy. More importantly, worsening climate change will increase the pressure to cut emissions. Failure to change energy and climate policy will mean choosing to fight over resources.

Yes, yes, yes! Hu's HDI approach is interesting, since it in theory ties mitigation burden to a broader range of factors than simply wealth; HDI is intended to measure institutional capacity and quality of life as well. But what's far more important is the premise of Hu's argument: that China's current climate change policy is out of step with the times, with its own national interest, and with reality.

In several recent, previous posts, CGS has described a shift in tone on climate issues. Hu's essay is another indication that elite opinion in China may be shifting towards one that accepts more concrete responsibility to reduce emissions. Let's certainly hope that shift is in evidence at the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen this December.

Climate impacts in China

We're all in for a rocky road ahead if climate change continues apace. But China, as a large, still mostly poor, ecologically diverse region, faces a special set of challenges, as the government acknowledges (see "China's Policies and Actions in Addressing Global Climate Change"). This post draws on some recent news reports to illustrate some of the various impacts China is likely to confront as the climate changes.

One is disease: as many high-altitude and high-latitude areas warm, the viable ranges of pathogens and disease vectors (like mosquitoes) increase. Zhao Linnuo, Deputy-Director of the China Applied Meteorology Office, explained to Xinhua that atmospheric warming produces conditions favorable to the spread and propagation of insect-borne diseases. "If pathogens formerly confined to the south were to spread to the north," Zhao said, "diseases [formerly confined to the] wild may spread into inhabited areas; at the same time, the incidence of food-borne diseases is likely to increase as a result of warming." Climate change would also impact human health, Zhao noted, via secondary impacts on precipitation, wind velocity, and pollution concentrations (see Xinhua, in Chinese only).

Another expert, Jin Yinlong, explained that climate change will increase the incidence of both flooding and drought; in the former case, it would also lead to the spread of water-borne disease. "Climate change is likely to impact all people in different ways," Jin said.

In a separate interview, the Vice-Director of China's Meteorological Bureau warned that "from now on, extreme weather events will grow more frequent." Because China's population density and GDP total will also increase, Xu Xiaofeng noted, its vulnerability to extreme weather events, including flooding, hurricanes, etc., will become more acute. The article also noted that from 2001-2008, the cost of natural disasters is estimated to have accounted for some 2.8% of China's GDP (see China Economic Weekly, in Chinese only).

Perhaps most importantly, the officials also offered prescriptions on how to counter the threats posed by the spread of disease and extreme weather. The former article noted that atmospheric experts "call on businesses and the people at large to take steps to increase their awareness of climate change, safeguard the air we breathe, make a habit of saving energy to reduce emissions, sparely use wooden chopsticks and plastic bags, and rarely drive cars." Vice-Director Xu also noted that America has a robust disaster-warning system in place, one that China would do well to adopt.

These two articles nicely illustrate two of the key strategies for dealing with climate change: mitigation (as by driving fewer cars) and adaptation (warning people of natural disasters, which are likely to become more frequent). It's heartening to see so much talk of climate in the Chinese press; a few years ago, there was almost none. The high profile of expert discussion on climate also bodes well; it's much the same kind of citizen-science that has been so crucial in pushing the climate agenda forward in America.

But of course all of this means little unless China's elite agrees to do more to reduce its emissions. A recent editorial in China Daily nicely sums up the situation:

With nobody but ourselves to blame for increasingly frequent extreme weather conditions, it is high time we did something to reduce the greenhouse emissions we discharge. The convening of the United Nations' conference on climate change at the end of last year was a sign that increasing numbers of countries and politicians have come to realize that climate change is something that nations must jointly deal with. We cannot afford to wait until it is too late - when the rising seas have submerged continents and the disappearance of glaciers has dried up our rivers. This annual day [World Meteorological Day] should be a reminder to all that we have an impact on world weather, and that global warming is a matter of life and death.

Word. It's long past time to bicker about things like the amount of carbon embedded in China's exports, or even the admittedly stronger argument about the West's high levels of historic emissions (see previous post). China must move beyond its fixation on its developing-country status, to the more pressing issue of how it will be affected- in terms of disease, weather, water, etc- if it does not act to reduce its own emissions, which account for so much of the global total. China Daily hits exactly the right note- we hope it's one China is willing to sing at Copenhagen come December.

Focus on water in China

The World Water Forum, which convened last week in Turkey, may not be the sexiest of international environmental gatherings. But it is likely to become one of the most important, for the chief human impact of climate change is likely to be profound changes in the availability and distribution of fresh water. Mindful of such importance, this post focuses on China's water situation in an age of climate change.

The devastating drought which hit northern China in recent months, affecting some 10.3 million hectares, was a potent reminder of the nation's precarious water situation. One farmer was quoted as saying, "I haven't seen such a severe drought in my life" (see Xinhua). Overpopulation, exacerbated by decades of disastrous, yield-maximizing agricultural policies, has devastated large portions of northern China, leaving it vulnerable to desertification, which climate change in turn is accelerating. Poor soil management results in extensive erosion; one recent report claimed that China loses 1 million mu (about 0.6 acres) of arable land annually to soil erosion (see Renmin Ribao, in Chinese only). In the meantime, climate models, while subject to significant uncertainty, suggest that seasonal runoff from the Himalayan plateau is likely to decrease precipitously in the coming years, affecting nearly all of China's major river systems (see previous post).

The gravity of the situation has not gone unnoticed by China's government. Its response to the drought was swift, issuing a "red alert" in some areas of the country, and providing emergency assistance. Meanwhile, experts issued a string of announcements focusing better on water management and efficiency. The President of the China Agricultural University emphasized water-saving irrigation techniques: "To deal with climate abnormalities, a growing water shortage, and the threat to food security, we must speed the use of farming and irrigation methods that save water" (see Xinhua). In early March, the powerful National Development and Reform Commission vowed to lower industrial water consumption by 5.6% and to increase the utilization of industrial wastewater to some 66% in 2009.

At the World Water Forum itself, China's Minister of Water Resources, Chen Lei, vowed to increase China's efforts to develop water resources for sustainable development. Chen highlighted ten areas where the government would ramp up water infrastructure investment:

"the reinforcement of risky reservoirs, rural drinking water security, water saving facility upgrading in large-scale irrigation areas, comprehensive management of major rivers and lakes, rehabilitation and upgrading of large-scale irrigation pumping stations, key water projects and water sources, water infrastructure construction in farmland, water and soil conservation, rural hydropower development and electrification, as well as capacity building" (see Xinhua).

At the Forum, China also issued a joint statement with Japan and South Korea pledging cooperation, information sharing, and "trilateral cooperation" on water issues (see Xinhua). There are a great many areas of fruitful cooperation on water management issues, including eco-compensation and watershed management.

The attention being devoted to water issues is welcome, but it's likely to be insufficient, for three primary reasons. First, China's main approach to water resource management so far has been to conduct giant engineering projects, like the South-North Water Transfer effort to bring water from the south to the arid north. But engineering alone is little more than a stop-gap measure, which a recent reservoir project in Shanghai illustrates. The Shanghai region, being a low-lying coastal estuary, is vulnerable to salt tides, which contaminate freshwater supplies. As the sea level rises, salt tides are a growing concern in coastal areas around the world. The government's response to salt tides has been to construct the giant Qingcaosha reservoir, with a capacity of 7.2 million cubic meters. But as the Shanghai Daily article announcing the reservoir notes, "A new reservoir is by no means the long-term answer to the city's chronic lack of clean water." Silt from the Yangtze (another result of soil erosion), the article notes, is likely to clog the reservoir. Moreover, if runoff to the Yangtze declines as propitiously as predicted, Shanghai may have to resort to expensive desalinization to supply adequate freshwater. Despite the temptation to think so, humanity can't simply engineer itself out of water shortages.

Which leads to the second challenge confronting water management in China: the shamefully low price of water. Despite continual pledges to raise it (see China.org.cn), the Chinese government has found it difficult to make poor peasant farmers, who account for the majority of wasteful water use in China, pay significantly more for water. As a result, the price remains too low to encourage the most advanced water saving techniques. According to one water expert, "Although water-saving measures are used in northern China, many mature technologies aren't popular because of the high cost and low awareness of saving water" (see Xinhua). So the impasse continues: as long as the government remains undecided about how to encourage rural economic development without raising the price of water, China's agricultural sector will continue to waste large amounts of water.

This is a dangerous path to tread, since there is likely to be less and less of it, at least in northern China. Climate change means that droughts and flooding are both likely to become more severe, and while the distribution of precipitation will undoubtedly change in many regions, it's likely to be for the worse. Engineering projects, like reservoirs and desalinization plants, will help with adaptation and the stabilization of drinking water supplies, but ultimately such engineering will not compensate for the shifts in water availability. That requires tackling climate change. So far, as CGS has continually documented, China has taken a very conservative position on climate issues (see previous post).

However, as a recent China Daily editorial illustrates, China is re-evaluating its stance as the crucial Copenhagen climate conference approaches in December. Climate change, the editorial notes, "is hitting the Asian continent already." Repeating a standard Chinese government line, the editorial emphasizes that Asian nations should push for more money for adaptation, but then goes on to note that "The focus on adaptation...should not distract us from also paying attention to the other major building block, mitigation, and formulating a clear strategy on the issue." While the focus should remain on pushing developed nations to reduce emissions, the editorial also says that calls for "urging larger developing countries to take whatever actions they can to reduce theirs without hampering their development aspirations." Most importantly, the editorial hits the right note in concluding that the Copenhagen agreement "will determine the fate of the world, in particular Asia, for decades to come."

Water is a key environmental issue for China, Asia, and the world, making its management one of the foremost considerations for policymakers everywhere. This requires negotiating thorny issues of access, fighting important agricultural constituencies, and many other issues. But it also entails solving the climate problem- the over-arching, all-important wildcard on the fate of which all other environmental issues will ultimately rest.

China and the Climate Issue under Obama

President Obama's Inaugural Address, delivered yesterday, was music to the ears of those who care about climate change. As Climate Progress notes, Obama included a remarkable call "to nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say that we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders, nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect."


It's as if he had magically gathered all the anguished pleas from scientists, academics, environmentalists, and common folk over the past decade to act on climate, and made of them a poem. The time is now, and the most powerful man in the world gets it. With renewed spirit, this post looks again at the prospects for a new global climate deal that includes China.


The Necessity for US Leadership in Securing China's Cooperation

A few weeks ago, CGS wrote about an essay by a Chinese academic, Zhang Haibin, expressing optimism for progress on the climate issue under Obama. The greatest impediment to China's participation, wrote Zhang, is lack of American leadership. The consequences of this failure are elaborated in an excellent review of China's climate policy written by scholar Tu Jianjun:

Chinese policymakers and academia generally weigh GHG emissions control as significant liabilities instead of potential assets to the national economy. Such perceptions were reinforced by the outgoing Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 and most of Annex I countries’ failure to meet their Kyoto commitments. Beijing has already expressed it’s belief that any mandatory emission cap would unfairly limit the nation's economic growth. Thus, rejecting mandatory emissions caps will be the bottom line for Beijing’s climate policy in the foreseeable future. Ironically, although the U.S. government used the absence of key developing countries as an excuse to justify its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the sudden disappearance of U.S. pressure on China in 2001 actually made it possible for Beijing to maintain a “wait and see” climate policy for quite a while.

In contrast, Tu goes on to note, a joint US-EU push would likely cajole Beijing into accepting greenhouse gas emissions reductions. As he puts it, "If developed nations as a whole could meet their GHG reduction commitments, it is not unimaginable that China may eventually accept an intensity-based mandatory GHG reduction target." Tu's argument, then, serves simply to underline the importance of American leadership in getting China to be part of a global climate deal. On the climate issue, at least, it seems many in China will be taking their cues from Washington in the coming months.

China is Watching

In a notable essay published just before Obama's inauguration entitled "Obama's 'change' can begin with the climate issue," (奥巴马的“变革”可能从气候问题开始, in Chinese only) Tsinghua University scholar Guan Qingyou argues that Obama's climate policy can be the very emboidment of his "change" mantra. Guan outlines a remarkable vision in which President Obama's America becomes a "clean energy superpower," and reclaims the title of global climate leadership from Europe ("...领导美国成为清洁能源大国，并以积极的姿态参与国际气候谈判，从欧洲人手中重新夺回话语权。") Guan draws a sharp distinction between this vision of leadership, and the failed policy of former President Bush ("他还批评了小布什政府 的气候变化政策，表示在他的总统任期内他将带领美国重新在气候变化方面承担领导者的角色。")

Perhaps most notably, though, Guan expresses strong support for Obama's vision that a clean economy can also be a prosperous one. The new President's assertion that clean energy deployment can promote economic growth and create jobs, says Guan, is a sound one ("奥巴马认为，清洁能源的开发计划是振兴美国经济的一部分，能够创 造出数百万个就业机会，成为美国经济的新的增长点。因此，应对气候变化与振兴经济并不矛盾。这一点笔者倒是非常认同...应对金融危机和气候危机的计划，是可以毕其功于一役的.")

Consensus is emerging among Western nations for strong action on climate change, he argues, and the trend is inexorable ("从澳大利亚到美国，从陆克文到奥巴马，西方大国的政治领袖的观点正越来越趋于一致，即各国政府必须采取措施遏制和适应全 球气候变化的趋势"). The climate cause has become a global one, Guan says, and suggests that it has ceased to be a factual issue, instead becoming a matter of politics ("气候变化问题实在也已经很难再称之为有争议的科学问题了，而成为一种世界潮流、价值观或者说“宗教”。在这样的背景下，谈论气候变化问 题便有了一个“政治正确性”的问题“）。

Given this reality, Guan writes, the world will await America's metamorphasis. It's up to America, he suggests, to prove to the world that economic growth and climate sustainability can go hand in hand. If it succeeds in articulating this, a true model for sustainable development, Guan indicates that China will be all ears ("尽管改变现状阻力重重，但变革的远期依然值得期待。至少从这点看，奥巴马所宣扬的“变革”意义深远而重大。既然如此，我们是不是也该学习一下奥巴马的雄心壮志？")


The Necessity of Now


So America has its marching orders to lead the world into a new era of climate cooperation, one which includes China. But some new research lends further impetus to begin the process without delay. A new paper from Harvard's Kennedy School argues that China's emissions growth will be faster than predicted, probably putting atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration stabilization targets out of reach within a decade or two, making China's participation on a global deal even more crucial (However, lower economic growth may slow emissions growth- see previous post). A separate, economic analysis of various climate agreement models indicated that, from a "cost and enforceability standpoint, GHG stabilization at 450 ppm for CO2 only (a common standard) is hardly achievable." If these analyses prove to be correct, the politics of climate agreements, never simple, are likely to become almost impossibly complicated.

Once More Into the Breech, Dear Friends...

Obama was right to call for a new era of responsibility. As individuals, nations, and societies, we must become more aware of our responsibilities to one another. Only with respect to the common principle of responsibility does it make sense to save an intangible climate, and indeed, to save eachother. 人人都有责。