How to make international environmental cooperation work; Or, Report from EU Workshop on Carbon Capture and Sequestration Regulation

This past Wednesday and Thursday, CGS attended a workshop on the European Union's Support to Regulatory Activities in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) (STRACO2) and Cooperation Action Within CCS EU-China (COACH) projects. The former, STRACO2, is devoted to gathering lessons for China from CCS regulatory regimes in place elsewhere, while the latter, according to its website, has as its main objective

"to prepare the ground for developing large-scale facilities for zero emission electric power using coal as a feedstock. Options for hydrogen production as well as for production of synthetic fuels, and provisions for heat integration with surrounding industries will be investigated too. In this endeavour CO2 capture and permanent storage - including use for enhanced oil or gas recovery (EOR or EGR) - constitute an inherent and decisive prerequisite."

Because they focus on a key climate change mitigation technology- CCS- the STRACO2/COACH projects represent an important case study in international environmental cooperation, hence CGS's interest. Briefly, CCS is a technology that envisions capturing carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion and "storing" it in impermeable geological formations, preventing its escape to the atmosphere. CCS is typically envisioned as a major "wedge" in reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, since it theoretically permits the use of abundant fossil fuels without contributing to the change in the planet's carbon balance. As one workshop speaker noted, many GHG reduction scenarios envision almost 30% of reductions coming from the large-scale deployment of CCS (see Rob Socolow and Steve Pacala's classic wedge paper on this). Problem is, it's far from a commercially-viable technology, hence the importance of the workshop. Deployment of CCS entails overcoming a number of challenges, including finding suitable geologic formations and developing an adequate regulatory framework for storing the carbon.

The STRACO2/COACH project is wide-ranging, including carbon storage site qualification and certification and financing. A particularly interesting feature of the STRACO2 project was the use of questionnaires to survey the CCS field in China, and which provide interesting insights into the prospects for China. Some 60 forms with questions on policy and finance, technology outlook, etc., were sent to a variety of environmental, energy, research, and consultancy firms in China, with 35 responses. These indicated that 43% of respondents see CCS as an "extremely important" technology for combatting climate change, while an additional 57% ranked it as "important." Respondents listed (in ranked order) high cost, unproven technology, underdeveloped law and policy, and underdeveloped technology as the most important barriers to CCS commercialization in China. Large majorities of respondents also reported that developed nations for pay for the development of CCS projects before commercialization, and that emissions trading offers the best prospect for long-term CCS financing. Notably, a significant majority also indicated that EOR technology, which involves injecting CO2 into oil wells as oil is withdrawn, represents the best storage option. Finally, respondents listed safety and responsibility as the most important considerations for developing a CCS regulatory regime in China.

The workshop also revealed a number of more general considerations and points of interest. There is a significant degree of suspicion over whether carbon can be safely stored underground, and whether "leakage" of carbon dioxide may pose a health risk to surrounding communities. China's geological storage potential also appears to be less favorable than in other countries, calling the widespread deployment of CCS into question. Several gaps were assessed in China's CCS capabilities, particularly in modelling technologies. The question of financing is also thorny; while most Chinese respondents indicated that developed countries should pay for the development of CCS technology, it's unclear how this might occur. Several experts, for example, spoke against inclusion of CCS in the Clean Development Mechanism, an important means of expanding clean technology in China. Perhaps most notably, one workshop speaker assessed the future of CCS as "uncertain," stating that its capabilities are "often assumed, not assessed."

In addition, the STRACO2/COACH project points out several significant issues for international clean technology cooperation. First is the need for robust stakeholder consultation: many in China remain suspicious of CCS. Second, governments will have to engage in significant discussion over intellectual property issues, and ensure that broader industrial and science/technology policy is aligned with clean technology cooperation. Much more attention will also have to be given to the details of financing and incentivization for clean technology.

Finally, the workshop highlighted the utility of person-to-person exchange in enhancing clean technology cooperation. Debbi Seligsohn of the World Resources Institute described a program that gathered an interdisciplinary team of experts from China and the US to explore the various issues involved in CCS deployment, and then organized a US study tour for participants, to be followed soon by a parallel China tour. By linking the people working on the ground in China with their counterparts in the US, the program helped to highlight important issues and challenges in CCS deployment, and stands a good chance of catalyzing long-term international partnerships.

In sum, then, the workshop illustrated several important lessons for international environmental cooperation. First, as China, America, the EU, and other nations struggle to ramp up clean technology deployment, such expert exchange programs will need to become a more common feature of the international landscape. Second, economists and policymakers should prioritize the issues of stakeholder consultation, financing, and intellectual property. CGS has been blessed to witness a sea change in the prospects for international environmental cooperation- but the hard work is yet to come.

More mixed messages on climate as NPC Continues

Given the importance of China's annual National People's Congress (NPC), it's worth expanding on yesterday's post to cover a few other signs of the direction China's climate policy will take in the coming year.

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told the NPC that China will continue its efforts to increase energy efficiency, thereby decreasing greenhouse gas emissions. In particular, Wen said, ""We will implement energy-conserving measures for power generators, boilers, automobiles, air-conditioners and lighting products" (see Xinhua). The official English-language news article covering Wen's speech also carried quotations from several government officials vowing that environmental protection efforts will continue despite the economic crisis.

A China Daily editorial painted a similarly robust picture of China's efforts to reduce emissions, gushing that

Reducing carbon emissions by weaning industries off oil will not only "green the globe" but also spur growth, spark an employment boom and help combat climate change. And China is best poised to not only effect the new deal but also to reap the benefits of it.

The editorial even gave a nod to the positive atmosphere surrounding US-China climate cooperation by claiming that "As US President Barack Obama's administration pushes for an economy that provides both economic and environmental security, China can ride and contribute to the potential lush wave of inventions and initiatives." This kind of perspective is, of course, what CGS has always pushed for.

One more positive piece of news comes from a member of China's People's Political Consultative Committee, Zhang Guobao. Zhang, noting that Obama has devoted a large portion of America's economic stimulus package to developing new energy sources, called for China should do the same. "If we continue not to take new energy seriously," Zhang warned, "I predict that in another ten years we will be in the same situation as Japan" when it comes to that country's dependency on imported energy (see Renmin Ribao, in Chinese only).

On the other side of the coin, a recent editorial in China Daily exemplifies the old "don't blame China" school of thought when it comes to climate issues. Entitled "Don't blame China for the world's eco-woes," the editorial complained that

Critics still blame China as it builds new cities with modern homes, running water, sewage systems, transport infrastructure, schools and hospitals, just as their countries did. They blame China as it serves the needs of hundreds of millions of farmers moving from the land to the cities in the biggest urbanization program in human history. No nation has ever had to do this before, and the challenges are highly complicated.

There's some truth to this complaint (see previous post), but the real tragedy is that anyone, either in China or abroad, still thinks of the climate issue as a blame game. We're all responsible for changing the planet's carbon balance (though admittedly to differing degrees), and we'll all bear the consequences. The fact is, times have changed and nobody, in China, the United States, or elsewhere, can build new cities without making them sustainable.

Nonetheless, this kind of retrograde thinking appears to be winning out when it comes to China's stance on climate. The leadership appears to be consumed with concerns over jobs, stability, and restive minorities. When it comes to the low-hanging fruit and the "general principle" of climate sustainability, Beijing appears to be committed. But when it comes to making hard decisions, and paying a price, the message appears much more mixed.

Once again, it seems to CGS that foreign leadership will be crucial. The pieces cited above all reference Washington's actions in pushing green stimulus. If America can figure out how to drive economic growth with climate-sustainable features, you can bet that there will be plenty of receptive ears at next year's NPC.

Mixed messages on environment as National People's Congress convenes

Every March, China's National People's Congress (NPC), the nation's highest legislative body, convenes in Beijing to ratify the decisions of the nation's leadership. It is often an occasion to announce major shifts in policy, and so it's an important context in which to consider discourse on environmental protection. On the basis of two admittedly incomplete measures, the message is very mixed: while official media continues to highlight the severity of environmental issues, the portion of China's economic stimulus package devoted to environmental protection has decreased.

This week's China Daily includes a number of articles devoted to environmental issues, including one entitled "Innovation needed in alternative energy field," and another noting that "Sino-US talks turning to action" on climate change. The former article editorialized that "developing a low-carbon economic is a must as China continues to industrialize, not only for the nation's energy security, but also as part of an urgent international responsibility to address global climate change." This language, from two professors of public administration at Hunan University, is a noticeable shift from the standard government position that tackling climate change should be a developed-nation task. The latter article, depicting joint US-China efforts to improve energy efficiency, emphasized the co-benefits that could result from greater collaboration on energy matters. In general, the message seemed to be that environmental sustainability must remain a central goal of government policy, and that China should see action on environmental issues as part of its responsibilities as an emerging global power.

Sadly, this welcome news did not seem to be reflected where the rubber meets the road. According to China Environmental Law Blog and Caijing, the percentage of China's economic stimulus package to be devoted to environmental efforts is set to decrease. The amount of stimulus money devoted to "sustainable environment" will decline by over 120 billion RMB, with most of that amount being redirected to social welfare spending.

It's understandable to redirect stimulus money to ease the economic pain being faced by so many laid-off workers in China (and indeed, around the world). But this "readjustment" indicates just how difficult it will be for leaders around the world to implement green stimulus packages. As is so often the case, short-term economic considerations and long-term environmental sustainability stand at political odds.

Nonetheless, international coordination and consultation on implementing green stimulus could help governments keep their stimulus packages relatively green. Because initiatives to create green jobs and expand clean energy have never been attempted at such large scales, sharing best practices is a natural way for governments to enhance international financial and environmental cooperation (see previous post).

Here's to hoping Beijing, Washington, and governments around the world can their acts together and push green stimulus packages even as legislators push narrow self-interest.

Momentum on US-China climate cooperation builds; Tsinghua holds "Overcoming Obstacles to US-China Cooperation on Climate Change" Seminar

Following Secretary of State Clinton's visit to Beijing, Ken Lieberthal, co-author of a landmark Brookings Institution report on US-China climate cooperation, headlined a seminar at Tsinghua University on overcoming obstacles to such cooperation. This post offers a brief re-cap of the seminar, and goes on to note some of the ripple effects of Clinton's visit. In general, it's fair to say there's a lot of momentum in US-China climate cooperation; the challenge will be to sustain it even as both countries plunge further into recession.

Dr. Lieberthal mainly elaborated on one of the report's main findings, that climate cooperation should be seen as central to the US-China relationship. Secretary Clinton, Lieberthal noted, raised the climate issue in almost every meeting she had during her visit to Beijing. Washington should sustain this emphasis, Lieberthal continued, and see bilateral climate cooperation as the motor for global action. US-China climate cooperation should in turn be part of a shift in the bilateral relationship which views China as a strategic partner on a range of global issues, as opposed to merely regional ones like North Korea.

Lieberthal was also emphatic that Chinese leaders should understand that their willingness to offer concrete steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions directly impacts Washington's ability to do the same; the chief opposition argument to US action is that it will make no difference unless China takes similar steps. Such political arguments also obscure real advantages in strengthening US-China climate collaboration. Lieberthal cited in particular the relative advantages of using China for clean technology demonstration projects: in America, a carbon capture and sequestration plant requires a 6-year permitting process; in China, the time period is less than 2 years.

The reactions of Chinese panelists, including former People's Congress leader Cheng Siwei and Tsinghua professor Hu Angang, broadly fit under the "cautious optimism" paradigm (see previous post). Cheng agreed that trust and dialogue is essential, but went on to reiterate the familar talking points regarding historical emissions, China's developing country status, and the "embedded carbon" in making exports for the West (this is clearly a spurious argument; see China Environmental Law on this).

Hu was a bit bolder, noting that "If the US does not succeed [in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions], neither will China." Hu also called climate change an integral consideration for 21-st century economic development policy, and called the creation of a green economy an opportunity for China to "leapfrog" the most carbon-intensive stages of economic growth. The US and China have shared dreams, said Hu, including a "green dream." Perhaps most consequentially, Hu argued that China should see action on climate change as part of its responsibility as a global power and leader in the world.

Such positivity was broadly, if more cautiously, echoed across the Chinese bureaucracy. The deputy chief of China's National Energy Administration told a US-China forum on energy efficiency that "The two countries could further cooperate on a wide range of areas in the development of economic and energy sectors against the background of economic globalization" (see Xinhua). China Daily issued a sunny report on the Tsinghua seminar, before concluding with a cautious quotation from Cheng: "Dialogues on climate change are in the interest of both China and the US, but each side should work out a plan to combat climate change according to different national conditions."

Meanwhile, China's National Statistics Bureau announced that the nation's energy intensity fell 4.59% in 2008, slightly higher than predicted (see Xinhua). While this is a step forward, the number more than anything else indicates the scale of the task confronting US-China climate cooperation. China Environmental Law has an excellent post on this, so CGS will do no more than to conclude by saying we must hope that the Hu-Lieberthal view of climate cooperation as a strategic and central issue is sustained over time. It really is nothing less than a test of both nation's ability to be responsible partners in the international community- in America's case, after eight years of reckless unilateralism, and in China's case, as part of coming to terms with becoming an economic giant.

Sino-American green stimulus; or, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) Report: "Strengthening US-China Climate Engagement"

The US-based environmental NGO Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) has recently released a report on strengthening US-China climate "engagement." The report comes on the heels of similar reports issued by the Brookings Institution and the Asia Society (see previous post), and contains many of the same observations and recommendations. Nonetheless, the report frames US-China climate cooperation in a slightly different way, which deserves further commentary.

More so than the other two reports, NRDC observes that the US and China are taking parallel tracks when it comes to investing a large portion of their respective economic stimulus efforts in green efforts. This is new to both governments, and yet the objective, in terms of creating green jobs and expanding the use of green technologies, is remarkably similar. It only makes sense, then, for Washington and Beijing to coordinate the green components of their stimulus packages. NRDC, for example, recommends the creation of a "green jobs forum" to share lessons learned (p 3). It's a good idea, and in principle there's no reason why there shouldn't be a high-level and wide-ranging discussion between the two governments on what works and what doesn't when it comes to green stimulus. Coordination between the two countries could also lead to synergistic investment in specific, highly promising areas of clean technology research and develelopment.

Of course, economic stimulus is politically charged in both countries, and there's a limit to how willing either government will be in disclosing failures to use public money to good effect. In the United States, Washington may take some hits from the political right for talking to China when many Americans are still hurting from the flight of manufacturing across the Pacific. But high-level consultation and coordination between the American and Chinese green stimulus packages is still worth trying.

The NRDC report also suggests one other intriguing idea. Noting that China often lacks the capacity to accurately report its greenhouse gas emissions, the report recommends that the US offer technical assistance to bolster emissions monitoring capabilities (p 11). CGS is tempted to take this one step further, and argue that the US and China should work towards joint reporting of annual national greenhouse gas emissions.

But wait, you may say. Beijing would never go for that, and statistic ambiguity is a time-tested instrument in the government's toolkit. True. But think of the benefits: joint reporting would necessarily bind US and Chinese emissions reductions efforts together. Moreover, it's hard to think of a better way to build mutual trust in the climate arena than to commit to joint, transparent reporting. Finally, joint monitoring could help to bolster emissions data collection and monitoring in both countries, and enhance climate science cooperation.

A coordinated stimulus and joint monitoring are medium-term objectives. In the meantime, several initial steps are of greater importance (see previous post). But in the face of climate change, it's necessary to think boldly and strategically. In this vein, the NRDC report provides some enticing new food for thought.

Clinton's Visit

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gets two thumbs up for her handling of the climate issue in Beijing. It's worth taking a little step back to think how far we've come in recent months. Just two months ago, the United States demonstrated its familiar reticence to take a leading role of climate at talks in Poznan (see previous post). But when she arrived in Beijing, Clinton placed the climate issue front and center, telling China "we hope you don't make the same mistakes we made" on climate. She also made a smart move in framing the climate issue as one that threatens the security of both nations, saying "This not a matter of politics or morality or right or wrong,” he said. “It is simply the unforgiving math of accumulating emissions” (see New York Times). Indeed, Clinton even went so far as to participate on a webchat, asking China's 300 million Internet users to "work together for a clean energy future" (see China Daily).

China's response to this welcome overture has been one of cautious optimism. China's Foreign Minister pledged that the economic crisis would not derail the country's greenhouse gas emissions reduction efforts, a welcome sign of confidence in the seriousness of the issue. ""The government's resolve to tackle climate change has not changed, and our actions have not weakened," the Minister said, before pledging that "We are willing to work together with the international community to push the Copenhagen talks forward and make sure they yield a positive result" (see China Daily). Elsewhere, however, China's government sought to emphasize the necessity of technology transfer if climate cooperation is to be enhanced. An official at the Ministry of Science and Technology was quoted as saying "China is glad to see that the US has started to take concrete action [on US-China climate cooperation]. But without funding and technology, cooperation would end up as empty talk" (see China Daily). The official went on to reference Beijing's familiar developing-country argument that it is unable to take on concrete GHG reduction targets (see previous post).

Beijing's hesitancy points towards the next step for a promising re-invigoration of US-China climate cooperation. The US and China must come to an agreement about technology transfer and financing the deployment of GHG mitigation technology. Chinese academic Zhang Haibin writes that "Hostility toward Communism excludes China from receiving official development aid from the United States, which could significantly hasten climate-change-related projects" (see New York Times), while a recent essay by Chinese environmental experts notes that international transfer of clean technologies remains underdeveloped (see China Dialogue).

In sum, then, Clinton's push on climate can be considered a success. The real work, though, lies ahead. As Zhang's statement indicates, Washington must build on its climate overture with a series of confidence-building measures to indicate its seriousness, including adopting binding emissions restrictions itself. It must also put its money where its mouth is on technology transfer- something that, particularly in the midst of economic crisis, is an unmistakable sign of conviction to tackle climate change through Sino-American partnership. Two smaller steps will be crucial to achieving these larger goals. First, China and the US need to reaffirm and expand the dialogue on climate and energy established under the Strategic Economic Dialogue (see previous post). Second, a joint task force should be formed at once to overcome the technical obstacles to technology transfer, most crucially intellectual property rights (see previous post).

As these steps are taken, Washington should also make clear to China that it expects reciprocation. The climate and energy dialogue should state at the outset that the ultimate outcome of US-China climate cooperation must be for China to reduce its GHG emissions by a set amount, within the framework of an equitable global agreement that promotes sustainable economic development. All this lies ahead. But it's nonetheless a huge achievement to be underway on the road towards a genuinely sustainable future.

US-China Environmental Cooperation as a Security Issue

Last week, CGS was summoned to coffee by a friend who works within China's environmental protection bureaucracy. The government, said friend confessed, is very worried about the intersection of the economic crisis, political discontent, and its environmental policy goals. Officials, according to this source, are increasingly concerned both that economic considerations might imperil China's transition to a low-carbon economy (低碳经济), and that public discontent over pollution and other environmental issues may translate into protests or worse.

They should be, and said friend's warning provides an impetus to explain why US-China environmental cooperation should be seen not only as an ecological, energy, or economic issue, but also as one bearing on the most hard-core realist conceptions of security. (Full disclosure: CGS has often described the field of environmental security as a little dubious).

The most obvious segue from China's environmental situation to security is via energy. China is the world's third-largest oil importer (see US Department of Energy Country Brief), with much of it passing along vulnerable sea routes through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca. China presently lacks the capacity to protect these crucial sea lanes, and thus is vulnerable to disruptions in oil production and transport in South, Southwest, and Southeast Asia. The Brookings Report, referenced in yesterday's post, notes that if China were to expand deployment of renewable and low-carbon energy sources, its energy security would be enhanced, probably also lowering tensions with other major oil consumers such as the United States and India in areas like Africa and Central Asia.

But the most serious security threat to arise from China's environmental situation comes from water scarcity. Most of the major river systems that feed and water China, India, and Southeast Asia depend on meltwater from the Himalayan region. Climate change is endangering this vital source of water for 60% of the human population. Himalayan glaciers, which provide some 70% of the flow of major Asian rivers, are melting at an extremely rapid rate; one study predicts that the Himalayan-Hindu Kush region will "run out of water" during the dry season (Barnett, T.P., et al. “Potential impacts of a warming climate on water availability in snow-dominated regions.” Nature. 438 (2005): 303-308).

Recent news reports from the present drought in northern China provide some indication of what might occur should this nightmare scenario transpire: "Highest Level of Emergency for Drought Declared" (see China Daily) and "2/3 of China's cities short of water" (see Renminribao, in Chinese only). The present dought, of course, cannot be conclusively tied to climate change, and is exacerbated by wasteful water use in China's northern regions. But as climate change accelerate, we can expect things to get worse.

The security implications for a China, India, and Southeast Asia short of water are obvious. Besides destabilizing massive and volatile populations, such a situation would interrupt economic growth in the very regions economists agree are central to global recovery. In a time when the head of America's Central Intelligence Agency identified unemployment as the primary threat to American security (see New York Times), it's frightening to contemplate a similar situation compounded by thirst for the majority of the human population.

US-China environmental cooperation, then, isn't just an ecological concern. It's not only good for economic growth or mutual understanding. It's also essential for the security of both nations. Combined, these rationales amount not only to a compelling case for investing heavily in US-China environmental cooperation, but a clear imperative. The world must figure out how to grow sustainably without poisioning its environmental commons, and especially its atmosphere. The United States and China must lead the way, otherwise we will all soon be living nastier, more brutal, and shorter lives- a Hobbesian security threat if ever there were one.

Exciting Times for US-China Climate Cooperation

After a New Year holiday, CGS is back in action, energized by several important developments in the field of US-China climate cooperation. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will soon arrive in China, and New York Times environment correspondent Andy Rivkin reports that "climate and energy will be high on the agenda."

There will plenty to discuss. The Brookings Institution and the Asia Society have both recently issued major reports probing the way forward for US-China climate cooperation. In the meantime, China is in the process of formulating a new Energy Law and its 12th Five Year Plan for Energy (see China Environmental Law Blog on this).

CGS will be back in the coming days with a fuller analysis of all these developments, but in the meantime, suffice it to say that the coming weeks will be a crucial period for US-China climate cooperation. One can safely say without resorting to hyperbole that the sustainable future we all crave may well hang in the balance.

A New Road for Environmental Protection in China

As the Year of the Ox draws nigh, and the opportunity to reflect on thirty years of reform and opening presents itself, China's envirocrats have declared that change is in the air. Our friends at Green Leap Forward and China Environmental Law have both reported on recent government declarations of a renewed focus on environmental protection in the new year. But beyond these proclamations, there are some signs of a deeper shift in China's environmental policy. Last week, China's Minister for Environmental Protection, Zhou Shengxian, gave a wide-ranging and apparently consequential speech entitled "Actively Probing a New Road to Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristics" (积极地探索有中国特色的环保新道路, in Chinese only). This post analyzes the speech, employing some occasionally awkward translations of the original Chinese, and highlights a few segments that could signal a new orientation to China's environmental policy. Or not- it's obviously too early to tell for sure. But regardless, it contains a few statements worthy of our further attention.

Zhou emphasizes that that a reformed Chinese environmental protection policy should be newly long-term in outlook, gradual, focused, and ambitious ("新道路具有长期性、阶段性、针对性和艰巨性的鲜明特点。") He is careful to expound on the "gradual" theme, saying vaguely that reform should proceed according to the different characteristics of the economic transformation process ("阶段性就是要根据工业化和城镇化进程中的不同特征.")

Nonetheless, Zhou makes it equally clear that fundamental change is needed. Historic transformation in the field of environmental protection, Zhou states, is the embodiment of the national policy of Scientific Development ("必须坚持历史性转变的指导思想。历史性转变是环保领域全面贯彻落实科学发展观的具体体现"). In order to effect this transformation, and to give greater strategic importance to environmental protection, Zhou emphasizes integration and coordination with other policy areas, including production, land, and urban planning. Through this integration, Zhou claims a new perspective and path can be forged for environmental protection policy in China ("要坚持把环境保护摆上更加突出的战略位置，与经济社会发展统筹考虑、统一安排、同时部署；坚持环保规划先行，与产业规划、土地规划、城市规 划相协调、相统一，以环保规划优化经济社会发展；坚持更新观念、创新方法，积极推进科学化、民主化决策，着力转变不适应不符合历史性转变的思想观念.")

Zhou goes on to explicitly call for the integration of environmental protection with economic and social development, which he identifies as the best way to ward off future damage to the environment ("...环境保护的理念和要求全面渗透到经济社会发展之中，是有效防范环境污染产生和资源环境损耗的重要防.") He advocates the formulation of an integrated "environment-economic policy" ("制定环境经济政策"), and calls for environmental protection concerns to permeate into every economic and social domain ("要将保护环境的要求体现在各领域，落实到社会组织的各方面，建立起全面覆盖经济社会发展的环境保护体系"). While at it, Zhou also addresses these economic and social ambitions to China's over-riding socioeconomic challenges ("要从我国区域发展不平衡、城乡差异大的实际出发...要把环保产业作为扩大内需的重要方面，以环境治理拉动环保产业发展，以绿色消费带动绿色生产，积极培育新的经济增长点.")

To cap it off, Zhou makes a rather dramatic appeal to the public and the Party leadership to help the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) advance its agenda ("充分发挥环保部门综合协调作用，调动社会各方面的力量参与环境保护工作...要充分发挥社会主义制度的优越性，不断完善党委领导、政府负责、环保部门综合管理、有关部门协调配合，全社会共同参与的环境管理体系.") Indeed, Zhou employs a bit of old-fashioned revolutionary rhetoric, calling for the mobilization of all available resources for the cause of environmental protection (" 团结和动员各方面的力量.")

Zhou's speech can be read several different ways. Most optimistically, it can be seen as a sign that China's leadership is making a serious attempt to develop a true sustainable development policy, in which environmental protection concerns are effectively integrated into policymaking. Most cynically, the speech can be seen as a shameless grab for power, attention, or both by the still-young MEP. The truth, as is often said, probably lies in the middle. Only time will provide an adequate iteration of exactly where China’s environmental protection policy lies.

In the meantime, though, something else is notable about Zhou’s speech. Subtly but unmistakably, the vision Zhou articles is identified as particularly, intrinsically Chinese. Indeed, it appears almost nationalistic at times, as when he evokes the need for Party leadership and China’s revolutionary heritage. The significance of this is difficult to identify, but it’s perhaps very consequential. Does the nationalistic tone represent an attempt to generate greater “buy-in” to environmental protection policy by the Party higher-ups? A simple nod to the anniversary of Deng’s reform and opening policy? Hard to say, but, I would argue, important to ponder. Future posts will revisit this question, and as always comments on the question are welcome.

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