Following Secretary of State Clinton's visit to Beijing, Ken Lieberthal, co-author of a landmark Brookings Institution report on US-China climate cooperation, headlined a seminar at Tsinghua University on overcoming obstacles to such cooperation. This post offers a brief re-cap of the seminar, and goes on to note some of the ripple effects of Clinton's visit. In general, it's fair to say there's a lot of momentum in US-China climate cooperation; the challenge will be to sustain it even as both countries plunge further into recession.
Dr. Lieberthal mainly elaborated on one of the report's main findings, that climate cooperation should be seen as central to the US-China relationship. Secretary Clinton, Lieberthal noted, raised the climate issue in almost every meeting she had during her visit to Beijing. Washington should sustain this emphasis, Lieberthal continued, and see bilateral climate cooperation as the motor for global action. US-China climate cooperation should in turn be part of a shift in the bilateral relationship which views China as a strategic partner on a range of global issues, as opposed to merely regional ones like North Korea.
Lieberthal was also emphatic that Chinese leaders should understand that their willingness to offer concrete steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions directly impacts Washington's ability to do the same; the chief opposition argument to US action is that it will make no difference unless China takes similar steps. Such political arguments also obscure real advantages in strengthening US-China climate collaboration. Lieberthal cited in particular the relative advantages of using China for clean technology demonstration projects: in America, a carbon capture and sequestration plant requires a 6-year permitting process; in China, the time period is less than 2 years.
The reactions of Chinese panelists, including former People's Congress leader Cheng Siwei and Tsinghua professor Hu Angang, broadly fit under the "cautious optimism" paradigm (see previous post). Cheng agreed that trust and dialogue is essential, but went on to reiterate the familar talking points regarding historical emissions, China's developing country status, and the "embedded carbon" in making exports for the West (this is clearly a spurious argument; see China Environmental Law on this).
Hu was a bit bolder, noting that "If the US does not succeed [in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions], neither will China." Hu also called climate change an integral consideration for 21-st century economic development policy, and called the creation of a green economy an opportunity for China to "leapfrog" the most carbon-intensive stages of economic growth. The US and China have shared dreams, said Hu, including a "green dream." Perhaps most consequentially, Hu argued that China should see action on climate change as part of its responsibility as a global power and leader in the world.
Such positivity was broadly, if more cautiously, echoed across the Chinese bureaucracy. The deputy chief of China's National Energy Administration told a US-China forum on energy efficiency that "The two countries could further cooperate on a wide range of areas in the development of economic and energy sectors against the background of economic globalization" (see Xinhua). China Daily issued a sunny report on the Tsinghua seminar, before concluding with a cautious quotation from Cheng: "Dialogues on climate change are in the interest of both China and the US, but each side should work out a plan to combat climate change according to different national conditions."
Meanwhile, China's National Statistics Bureau announced that the nation's energy intensity fell 4.59% in 2008, slightly higher than predicted (see Xinhua). While this is a step forward, the number more than anything else indicates the scale of the task confronting US-China climate cooperation. China Environmental Law has an excellent post on this, so CGS will do no more than to conclude by saying we must hope that the Hu-Lieberthal view of climate cooperation as a strategic and central issue is sustained over time. It really is nothing less than a test of both nation's ability to be responsible partners in the international community- in America's case, after eight years of reckless unilateralism, and in China's case, as part of coming to terms with becoming an economic giant.
Showing posts with label sustainable development. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sustainable development. Show all posts
Friday, February 27, 2009
Thursday, February 19, 2009
Good news for environmental regionalism in China- and sustainable development in Tibet
One of China Greenspace's favorite causes is environmental regionalism in China (see previous posts on international cooperation and regional environmental protection).
It's good news, then that China's Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is embarking on its "first large scale river basin enforcement campaign," which will cover the Yangtze and 10 tributaries (see China Environmental Law Blog). This kind of regional approach makes a lot of sense, particularly for watersheds (see previous post on Payment for Ecosystem Services for more on this). But the whole point of regionalism is that it liberates local authorities from central control, so we'll have to see whether MEP's role is more as coordinator or more as autocrat.
In addition, a recent post from China Dialogue offers some nice lessons about community-based sustainable development in Tibet. These lessons are worth a read, especially since they seem relevant to environmental protection in traditional-society contexts elsewhere in the world.
It's good news, then that China's Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is embarking on its "first large scale river basin enforcement campaign," which will cover the Yangtze and 10 tributaries (see China Environmental Law Blog). This kind of regional approach makes a lot of sense, particularly for watersheds (see previous post on Payment for Ecosystem Services for more on this). But the whole point of regionalism is that it liberates local authorities from central control, so we'll have to see whether MEP's role is more as coordinator or more as autocrat.
In addition, a recent post from China Dialogue offers some nice lessons about community-based sustainable development in Tibet. These lessons are worth a read, especially since they seem relevant to environmental protection in traditional-society contexts elsewhere in the world.
Sunday, January 11, 2009
Report from "China in a Turbulent Economic and Environmental Situation" Conference at Tsinghua University
This past Saturday, Tsinghua University's School of Public Policy and Management and the Brookings-Tsinghua Center hosted a conference entitled "China in a Turbulent Economic and Environmental Situation." This post gives a few highlights.
In a keynote presentation, famed economist and sustainable development expert Jeffrey Sachs called for a readjustment in global consumption patterns. Calling previous levels of US household consumption unsustainable, Sachs called for Chinese consumers to spend more, and American consumers less, thus changing global trade patterns. Perhaps most controversially, Sachs claimed that the level of government spending in the US economy is too low, and must grow over time to a permanently higher level. This position stands at odds with political sentiment in America, particularly since it implies sustained tax increases.
A panel of Chinese experts on economics and environmental protection claimed, in a nice turn of phrase, that China is "not yet an economic superpower, but is already a pollution superpower." Despite this honesty, much of the message was familiar: environmental pollution naturally follows economic development, China struggles with high resource consumption and high capital inputs. As one expert, Ren Yong, put it, China enjoys a "trade surplus, but an environmental deficit." In response to a question by Professor Sachs, the panel repeated the familiar line that emissions reduction targets for China are not feasible in the short term.
Nonetheless, a few notable messages were put forth. Scholar Song Ligang argued that China cannot afford to follow the "Kuznets curve model," which suggests that environmental protection is only achieved after a sustained process of economic development results in higher standards of living. Song also urged "proactive adaptation" to climate change, which would involve an adjustment of economic consumption patterns. Scholar Qi Ye continued to emphasize that China's current economic model is unsustainable, and that its environmental problems are likely to worsen as a result of the financial crisis, which will probably cause investment in environmental protection by local governments and enterprises to decrease.
CGS's main take-away from the conference is that China, like the rest of the world, is struggling to articulate a real theory of sustainable development. What is desperately needed is an economy-wide template for economic growth that reduces greenhouse gas emissions, air and water pollution, while also reducing capital inputs and improving energy security. China, given time, may well be successful in this effort. But success if far more likely given cooperation from the developed nations. Perhaps most usefully, the United States and Europe could strive to develop economy-wide sustainability strategies. By lighting the way, these countries can give a push to the growing realization in China that some new vision is needed.
In a keynote presentation, famed economist and sustainable development expert Jeffrey Sachs called for a readjustment in global consumption patterns. Calling previous levels of US household consumption unsustainable, Sachs called for Chinese consumers to spend more, and American consumers less, thus changing global trade patterns. Perhaps most controversially, Sachs claimed that the level of government spending in the US economy is too low, and must grow over time to a permanently higher level. This position stands at odds with political sentiment in America, particularly since it implies sustained tax increases.
A panel of Chinese experts on economics and environmental protection claimed, in a nice turn of phrase, that China is "not yet an economic superpower, but is already a pollution superpower." Despite this honesty, much of the message was familiar: environmental pollution naturally follows economic development, China struggles with high resource consumption and high capital inputs. As one expert, Ren Yong, put it, China enjoys a "trade surplus, but an environmental deficit." In response to a question by Professor Sachs, the panel repeated the familiar line that emissions reduction targets for China are not feasible in the short term.
Nonetheless, a few notable messages were put forth. Scholar Song Ligang argued that China cannot afford to follow the "Kuznets curve model," which suggests that environmental protection is only achieved after a sustained process of economic development results in higher standards of living. Song also urged "proactive adaptation" to climate change, which would involve an adjustment of economic consumption patterns. Scholar Qi Ye continued to emphasize that China's current economic model is unsustainable, and that its environmental problems are likely to worsen as a result of the financial crisis, which will probably cause investment in environmental protection by local governments and enterprises to decrease.
CGS's main take-away from the conference is that China, like the rest of the world, is struggling to articulate a real theory of sustainable development. What is desperately needed is an economy-wide template for economic growth that reduces greenhouse gas emissions, air and water pollution, while also reducing capital inputs and improving energy security. China, given time, may well be successful in this effort. But success if far more likely given cooperation from the developed nations. Perhaps most usefully, the United States and Europe could strive to develop economy-wide sustainability strategies. By lighting the way, these countries can give a push to the growing realization in China that some new vision is needed.
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
Poznan: Just bubbling with enthusiasm...
Not really. CGS was just searching for a witty title for this post about the potential for geothermal energy. Just as the global climate negotiations at Poznan looked to a dreary rehash of climate cliches (think of your children, cruel world!), the UN Environment Program announced new findings that indicate a minimum of 7000 megawatts of energy could be produced by tapping geothermal sources in Africa's Great Rift Valley. That's almost as much geothermal energy as the entire globe produces at the moment, according to the US National Renewable Energy Laborotory. Call East Africa "the Saudi Arabia of geothermal."
This geothermal capacity represents exciting sustainable-development potential for East Africa. Geothermal electricity plants are typically zero- or ultra-low emission facilities, though the technologies employed are not as mature as those used in fossil-combustion plants. The US Government is aiding a number of countries in assessing and developing geothermal resources, but it's fair to say that the vast majority of the world's geothermal potential remains untapped. China, for instance, generates about the same amount as the United States- some 2500 MW annually, but newer technologies being developed by the US Department of Energy promise to tap far greater heat resources.
It's uncertain how cost-effective expanded geothermal projects will be, particularly given the recent collapse of oil prices. But regardless, the East African find gives the sustainable development community a rare opportunity to cheer the potential for linking economic development and climate sustainability. Let's hope the US government continues to build on its efforts to diffuse and deploy geothermal in promising areas of the world- which seem to be growing more numerous.
This geothermal capacity represents exciting sustainable-development potential for East Africa. Geothermal electricity plants are typically zero- or ultra-low emission facilities, though the technologies employed are not as mature as those used in fossil-combustion plants. The US Government is aiding a number of countries in assessing and developing geothermal resources, but it's fair to say that the vast majority of the world's geothermal potential remains untapped. China, for instance, generates about the same amount as the United States- some 2500 MW annually, but newer technologies being developed by the US Department of Energy promise to tap far greater heat resources.
It's uncertain how cost-effective expanded geothermal projects will be, particularly given the recent collapse of oil prices. But regardless, the East African find gives the sustainable development community a rare opportunity to cheer the potential for linking economic development and climate sustainability. Let's hope the US government continues to build on its efforts to diffuse and deploy geothermal in promising areas of the world- which seem to be growing more numerous.
Sunday, November 2, 2008
Lord Stern's Lecture (Part Two) and China's Climate Negotiating Stance
Following that of last Tuesday, this post describes Lord Nicholas Stern's October 23 lecture at Beijing's Tsinghua University. It goes on to pose a broader explanation of China's climate negotiating stance.
Lord Stern's lecture laid out three principles to guide China's transition to a "low-carbon future": effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. The world should better recognize China's efforts to promote energy efficiency and develop renewable energy sources, Lord Stern urged, as well as strengthen technology transfer agreements with Beijing. Lord Stern was also careful to note the importance of American leadership in climate negotiations, terming it "crucial." Perhaps in a nod to Beijing's obsession with linking climate and development, Lord Stern concluded with the observation that the "two great challenges of the twenty-first century, tackling climate and poverty, are intrinsically linked."
Following Lord Stern, and on a similar note, Professor Angang Hu of Tsinghua's Center for the Study of China outlined a climate-responsibility approach based on the Human Development Index (HDI). HDI is a composite index calculated by the UN Development Program that ranks countries according to factors including GDP per capita, educational attainment, etc. High-HDI countries, argued Professor Hu, should agree to "unconditional" reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, while other nations take on "lesser responsibilities."
Professor Hu's HDI approach, in dis-aggregating the traditional developed-versus-developing country categories, puts a slightly different spin on the "common but differentiated responsibility" argument that Beijing holds so dear. Like Lord Stern, Professor Hu subtly implied that some big developing-country emitters (like China) should take on more responsibility for global GHG reductions.
Few impartial observers would disagree; sadly, the Chinese government is far from impartial. As a recent white paper entitled "China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change" makes clear, Beijing refuses to accept significant responsibility for reducing GHG emissions. And without China doing so, the United States is unlikely to make major concessions in terms of agreeing to GHG cuts. This situation threatens to derail any possibility of an effective new climate agreement to supersede the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012.
It's thus worth taking a closer look at China's position on the climate issue. The main official document on this topic is the 2007 "China's National Climate Change Program," produced by the National Development and Reform Commission. The program makes clear that developed countries must bear the brunt of GHG reductions: "The extent to which developing countries will effectively implement their commitments under the [UN Climate Change] Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed countr[ies] of their basic commitments." Since the program was released, China has surpassed the United States as the world's largest GHG emitter (see previous post), and scientists have released ever-more dire predictions of the consequences of unmitigated GHG emissions. Yet China's stance hasn't changed.
The recent white paper highlights three justifications (I'll call them "excuses") for this reticence. First, China claims its development situation makes it unable to afford major GHG cuts. "A large population and a relatively low level of economy determine that China's development task is a formidable one," the white paper proclaims, particularly since "The large population also brings huge employment pressure. New urban labor force entrants of 10 million and above need jobs every year" (p. 3). Second, the white paper bears homage to the familiar historical-emissions argument: "According to data from relevant international research institutions, from 1904 to 2004, carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning in China made up only 8 percent of the world's total over the same period" (p. 3). Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, the white paper seems to imply that China can develop its way out of responsibility for growing GHG emissions: "The Chinese government attaches great importance to the adjustment of the economic structure and the transformation of the economic development patterns, and has formulated and implemented a series of industrial policies and special programs to make the reduction of re-sources and energy consumption an important part of its industrial policies" (p. 10). Subsequent paragraphs make clear that "adjustment of the economic structure" means a transition towards service and high-tech industries, and away from big-polluter industries like coal. This claim is particularly disturbing because not only will such a transition take many years, but also because high-tech industries are not exactly carbon-neutral, accounting for about the same percentage of CO2 emissions as aviation.
So we have three excuses for not carrying the water when it comes to climate change. Some, especially the historic-emissions argument, are not wholly without merit. But China essentially asks for a free ride, with developing countries paying for its adoption of clean technology: "Developed countries should be responsible for their accumulative emissions and current high per-capita emissions, and take the lead in reducing emissions, in addition to providing financial support and transferring technologies to developing countries" (White Paper, p. 6). And when it comes to a global environmental challenge, the world's most populous nation has to pay at least part of the cost of resolution.
So what's to be done? Reading between the lines, there are a number of fruitful areas for international cooperation to prod China into agreeing to firm GHG reductions. First, Washington has to step up to the plate and lead the world towards a post-2012 agreement. The new president should call China on its pledge to "participate in all modes of international cooperation that are conducive to tackling climate change" by convening a major-emitters summit to both indicate its seriousness in agreeing to GHG emissions reductions, and to ask China to do the same. The summit can be followed by extensive bilateral talks under the aegis of the Strategic Economic Dialogue, which China takes very seriously. Such efforts have been tried and have failed before, but what can make the difference is the commitment of the next administration. Beijing certainly cannot be expected to make serious commitments without signals from Washington that it is important to do so.
Second, the United States should inaugurate a new program of bilateral technical assistance and academic exchange related to climate change. The flagging Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate should be re-energized and expanded with a mechanism for US government-financed transfer of green technologies to China. This mechanism might include a co-financing provision in order to prod China to invest more in the effort. The White Paper also suggests several fertile areas for bilateral cooperation in the adaptation technology China so keenly desires, which could help to build goodwill. The United States, despite its policy paralysis, has the best climate-science research facilities in the world, and partnerships with Chinese institutions can help accomplish the White Paper's goal of strengthening meteorological monitoring and climate change impact assessment (p. 8). Moreover, the increasing threat of tropical cyclones (Americans, think Hurricane Katrina) means that the United States and China have common cause in sharing expertise in restoring coastal ecosystems, which China's White Paper lists as a priority (p. 8). One could even envision a new exchange fellowship program, jointly funded by China and the United States, in which academic and professional experts who work on climate change could have the opportunity to conduct research in both countries.
Third, Western non-governmental organizations and institutions should embrace the opportunity to strengthen environmental education and environmental awareness efforts in China. Consider this extraordinary statement from the National Climate Change Program: "[An] Incentive mechanism should be established to encourage the public and enterprise participation in the climate change issue...[government should also focus on] increasing the transparency of decision-making on climate change issues; promoting the science and democracy in the area of climate change administration; giving full play to the initiative of social communities and non-governmental organizations" (National Climate Change Program, p. 55). Increase the transparency of decision-making? Promote democracy in administrative processes? Invite the participation of NGOs? This isn't what you usually hear from the Chinese government. There's exciting work to be done in developing environmental-awareness programs for Chinese schools, businesses, and maybe even government agencies. Western NGOs should be at the forefront. This is something that will be explored further in future posts.
Lord Stern was right to come to China (in fact he's come several times before). His renowned report makes clear that the cost of mitigating climate change is far less than adapting to its consequences. It's a concept the West is only just beginning to fully grasp. But for the sake of the planet, let's hope China gets it too, and soon.
Lord Stern's lecture laid out three principles to guide China's transition to a "low-carbon future": effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. The world should better recognize China's efforts to promote energy efficiency and develop renewable energy sources, Lord Stern urged, as well as strengthen technology transfer agreements with Beijing. Lord Stern was also careful to note the importance of American leadership in climate negotiations, terming it "crucial." Perhaps in a nod to Beijing's obsession with linking climate and development, Lord Stern concluded with the observation that the "two great challenges of the twenty-first century, tackling climate and poverty, are intrinsically linked."
Following Lord Stern, and on a similar note, Professor Angang Hu of Tsinghua's Center for the Study of China outlined a climate-responsibility approach based on the Human Development Index (HDI). HDI is a composite index calculated by the UN Development Program that ranks countries according to factors including GDP per capita, educational attainment, etc. High-HDI countries, argued Professor Hu, should agree to "unconditional" reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, while other nations take on "lesser responsibilities."
Professor Hu's HDI approach, in dis-aggregating the traditional developed-versus-developing country categories, puts a slightly different spin on the "common but differentiated responsibility" argument that Beijing holds so dear. Like Lord Stern, Professor Hu subtly implied that some big developing-country emitters (like China) should take on more responsibility for global GHG reductions.
Few impartial observers would disagree; sadly, the Chinese government is far from impartial. As a recent white paper entitled "China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change" makes clear, Beijing refuses to accept significant responsibility for reducing GHG emissions. And without China doing so, the United States is unlikely to make major concessions in terms of agreeing to GHG cuts. This situation threatens to derail any possibility of an effective new climate agreement to supersede the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012.
It's thus worth taking a closer look at China's position on the climate issue. The main official document on this topic is the 2007 "China's National Climate Change Program," produced by the National Development and Reform Commission. The program makes clear that developed countries must bear the brunt of GHG reductions: "The extent to which developing countries will effectively implement their commitments under the [UN Climate Change] Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed countr[ies] of their basic commitments." Since the program was released, China has surpassed the United States as the world's largest GHG emitter (see previous post), and scientists have released ever-more dire predictions of the consequences of unmitigated GHG emissions. Yet China's stance hasn't changed.
The recent white paper highlights three justifications (I'll call them "excuses") for this reticence. First, China claims its development situation makes it unable to afford major GHG cuts. "A large population and a relatively low level of economy determine that China's development task is a formidable one," the white paper proclaims, particularly since "The large population also brings huge employment pressure. New urban labor force entrants of 10 million and above need jobs every year" (p. 3). Second, the white paper bears homage to the familiar historical-emissions argument: "According to data from relevant international research institutions, from 1904 to 2004, carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning in China made up only 8 percent of the world's total over the same period" (p. 3). Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, the white paper seems to imply that China can develop its way out of responsibility for growing GHG emissions: "The Chinese government attaches great importance to the adjustment of the economic structure and the transformation of the economic development patterns, and has formulated and implemented a series of industrial policies and special programs to make the reduction of re-sources and energy consumption an important part of its industrial policies" (p. 10). Subsequent paragraphs make clear that "adjustment of the economic structure" means a transition towards service and high-tech industries, and away from big-polluter industries like coal. This claim is particularly disturbing because not only will such a transition take many years, but also because high-tech industries are not exactly carbon-neutral, accounting for about the same percentage of CO2 emissions as aviation.
So we have three excuses for not carrying the water when it comes to climate change. Some, especially the historic-emissions argument, are not wholly without merit. But China essentially asks for a free ride, with developing countries paying for its adoption of clean technology: "Developed countries should be responsible for their accumulative emissions and current high per-capita emissions, and take the lead in reducing emissions, in addition to providing financial support and transferring technologies to developing countries" (White Paper, p. 6). And when it comes to a global environmental challenge, the world's most populous nation has to pay at least part of the cost of resolution.
So what's to be done? Reading between the lines, there are a number of fruitful areas for international cooperation to prod China into agreeing to firm GHG reductions. First, Washington has to step up to the plate and lead the world towards a post-2012 agreement. The new president should call China on its pledge to "participate in all modes of international cooperation that are conducive to tackling climate change" by convening a major-emitters summit to both indicate its seriousness in agreeing to GHG emissions reductions, and to ask China to do the same. The summit can be followed by extensive bilateral talks under the aegis of the Strategic Economic Dialogue, which China takes very seriously. Such efforts have been tried and have failed before, but what can make the difference is the commitment of the next administration. Beijing certainly cannot be expected to make serious commitments without signals from Washington that it is important to do so.
Second, the United States should inaugurate a new program of bilateral technical assistance and academic exchange related to climate change. The flagging Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate should be re-energized and expanded with a mechanism for US government-financed transfer of green technologies to China. This mechanism might include a co-financing provision in order to prod China to invest more in the effort. The White Paper also suggests several fertile areas for bilateral cooperation in the adaptation technology China so keenly desires, which could help to build goodwill. The United States, despite its policy paralysis, has the best climate-science research facilities in the world, and partnerships with Chinese institutions can help accomplish the White Paper's goal of strengthening meteorological monitoring and climate change impact assessment (p. 8). Moreover, the increasing threat of tropical cyclones (Americans, think Hurricane Katrina) means that the United States and China have common cause in sharing expertise in restoring coastal ecosystems, which China's White Paper lists as a priority (p. 8). One could even envision a new exchange fellowship program, jointly funded by China and the United States, in which academic and professional experts who work on climate change could have the opportunity to conduct research in both countries.
Third, Western non-governmental organizations and institutions should embrace the opportunity to strengthen environmental education and environmental awareness efforts in China. Consider this extraordinary statement from the National Climate Change Program: "[An] Incentive mechanism should be established to encourage the public and enterprise participation in the climate change issue...[government should also focus on] increasing the transparency of decision-making on climate change issues; promoting the science and democracy in the area of climate change administration; giving full play to the initiative of social communities and non-governmental organizations" (National Climate Change Program, p. 55). Increase the transparency of decision-making? Promote democracy in administrative processes? Invite the participation of NGOs? This isn't what you usually hear from the Chinese government. There's exciting work to be done in developing environmental-awareness programs for Chinese schools, businesses, and maybe even government agencies. Western NGOs should be at the forefront. This is something that will be explored further in future posts.
Lord Stern was right to come to China (in fact he's come several times before). His renowned report makes clear that the cost of mitigating climate change is far less than adapting to its consequences. It's a concept the West is only just beginning to fully grasp. But for the sake of the planet, let's hope China gets it too, and soon.
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